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ABSTRACT
Essays on Dynamic Discrete Choice Models
by
Jongyearn Lee
Co-Chairs: Daniel A. Ackerberg and Yoonseok Lee
This dissertation presents three topics in dynamic discrete choices.
Chapter 1 sets up a dynamic model of demand to identify consumers preferences
for “newness” of products in a new durable goods market, namely golf drivers market.
Forward-looking heterogeneous consumers with preferences for newness of products
decide when and what to purchase. The model also accounts for the fact that the
market is highly subject to seasonal fluctuations. Using the aggregated data from
the US golf drivers market the model succeeds at identifying consumers preference
for newness of products when the seasonality and quality differences are controlled
for. Experiments with different assumptions are performed to confirm the robustness
of the model. Finally, a counterfactual analysis of a merger scenario is carried out to
see the effect of consumers preferences for newness on the volume of sales.
Chapter 2 is a joint essay with Yoonseok Lee. This chapter finds that the state
legislation decision on the mandatory motorcycle-helmet-use law is affected by the
neighboring states’ choices. It turns out that such a social interaction is one of the
key factors in this decision making, whereas the fatality rate from motorcycle-related
accidents is not so. Using the U.S. state level panel data, the analysis is conducted
ix
by developing a mixed proportional hazard model with grouped data, which allows
for possible cross sectional duration dependence. Though this analysis does not give
an answer to a long-debated issue whether to introduce the mandatory motorcycle-
helmet-use law, it explains a behavioral aspect of the legislative decision making
procedure (i.e. social interactions) and empirically shows how the proximity between
agents affects the decision making.
Chapter 3 deals with a dynamic panel data model where the dependent variable
is latent while only its ranking among individuals is observable at each time period.
It sets up a dynamic panel data model where the latent dependent variable is char-
acterized by its ranking in the previous period and current exogenous variables along
with individual heterogeneity. In order to overcome a small sample problem when the
number of individuals is large and the number of time periods is small, it uses the
explosion property of logit models with ranked data. As an application, this study
applies the econometric model to the panel ranking data of the best states for busi-
ness announced by Forbes magazine. It finds a significant relation between lagged
ranking, along with selective covariates, and current business environment.
x
CHAPTER I
When Consumers Are Fascinated by Brand-New
Models: A Case of US Golf Drivers Market
1.1 Introduction
In the market of golf drivers, consumers seem to have strong preferences for “new-
ness” of products. Another stylized fact of the golf drivers market is that the market
is highly subject to seasonal fluctuations. This chapter attempts to identify con-
sumers’ preferences for newness and measure the amount of newness premium when
the seasonality and quality difference are controlled for.
Then, what is newness? The definition we use in this study is the status of
being the latest model among its own brand.1 It is distinguished from the age of a
product defined as the time elapsed from the model’s first inception in the market.
Consumers do not prefer a product just launched last month to one released two
months ago simply because the former is introduced a month later than the latter.
Rather they compare all the latest models of several brands available in the market if
they care about new models much. In many circumstances, the newness of a product
does not necessarily mean a better quality, e.g. moving manufacturing site from US
to China for cost reduction that can yield lower quality. Moreover, the best seller is
1Throughout the chapter, we use firm and brand interchangeably. They are considered identical
but are used to represent the circumstances appropriately.
1
not always the best product.
Strong preference for the newness of a product can be explained by the prestige
and image effect. As in Stigler and Becker (1977) and Becker and Murphy (1993)
we can consider the prestige effects of consuming a new good. As Becker and Mur-
phy suggested we think of the effect of introducing a new model in a characteristic
sense. Having preferences for search and experience characteristics as described in
Stigler (1961), consumers also have preferences for “introducing characteristics” and
subsequently “newness characteristics” including when was the last time the brand
launched a new model and how frequently a brand introduces new models. Beyond
the prestige effect, to a small degree, the snob effect and the Veblen effect contribute
to the strong preference for newness. Observing fairly fast drops in price over time,
they play a role in explaining why consumers, or early adopters, want to purchase the
just launched drivers even though they are relatively expensive, instead of waiting
until the price falls sufficiently. Consumers prefer to use newer driver models because
they are different from those commonly used/preferred, e.g. your golf buddies envy
your new driver’s exclusive look. Some consumers buy a new model because they
think it serves as a means of attaining or maintaining their social status.
Golf drivers have rich taste aspects in a horizontal sense. Almost all observable
characteristics are taste characteristics including bona fide taste characteristics, e.g.
hitting sound, loft of head, length and stiffness of shaft, and feel of grip, as well as
many other characteristics inherently having trade-offs between them, e.g. distance
the driver carries a ball, accuracy, and forgiveness2. A difference in quality among
products still exists at least over time, a challenge to an econometrician that requests
to find an observable and discernable (to the econometrician) quality measure in a
vertical sense.3
2Forgiveness is a rough measure of golf clubs representing how good of a shot a golfer will get
when she misses. Due to the manufacturing reasons, it is well-known that the more forgiving a club
is, the less the distance is obtained.
3Handbags and shoes of luxury brands have same features as described. Markets of automobiles
2
For the time frame of data, 2005-2009, head size of a driver can serve as an effective
quality measure: it is observable for all models and it generally grows over time
encompassing overall performance improvement and raised cost. Most importantly,
it lets the consumers’ preference for newness be identified in the model by absorbing
all aspects of quality.4
In dealing with durable goods, recent literature extends models with demand-side
dynamics to explore consumers’ optimal timing problem. Consumers face intertemp-
toral trade-offs: they compare the value of purchasing a product today to what it
is expected later. Initiated by Melnikov (2001), a stream of literature adopt a logit
specification to derive the expected utility of product choice in a simple closed form
including Song and Chintagunta (2003), Gowrisankaran and Rysman (2011), Car-
ranza (2010), Zhao (2008), and Conlon (2010). Many of studies analyze high-tech
industries including digital cameras, video games, and LCD TVs. A stylized fact
in these industries is a declining price path over time, which motivates a dynamic
modeling of demand.
On the supply side, however, firms’ dynamic pricing decisions are not fully ex-
ploited except Nair (2007), Zhao (2008), and Conlon (2010) among others. Nair
models a serially correlated price process of forward-looking firms, Zhao deals with a
dynamic Euler equation approach originated in Berry and Pakes (2000) to derive the
optimality condition for pricing, and Conlon sets up forward-looking firms’ pricing in
response to demand state. However, they all rely on assumptions that eliminates the
inter-temporal influences between competitors to simplify the complicated problem
with strategic behaviors of firms.
or TVs share many facets with the golf drivers market but the quality of products is easily observable
and rated both by consumers and an econometrician. A Universal Serial Bus (USB) flash drive is an
example of goods with opposite traits. It has well-established grade of quality, i.e. storage capacity,
has negligible prestige effect, and little preference on the newness of products. Consumers generally
care about the specification of product only.
4See the Appendix A for a detailed explanation as to why almost all observable characteristics
of a driver are viewed in a horizontal sense, and why the size of each model’s head can serve as a
quality measure in the time frame of dataset analyzed: 2005-2009.
3
The model in this study extends approaches in previous studies mentioned above.
It is distinguished from them by explicitly modeling consumers’ preference for new-
ness of products which impact firms’ pricing and introducing decision. Observed
dynamic behavior of the market, this study models uniquely the transition of cyclical
seasonality. In the model, consumers are forward-looking and heterogeneous.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the
market for golf drivers to emphasize the stylized fact of consumers’ preference for
newness of products. Section 1.3 presents the model for dynamic demand designed
to explain the market behavior when consumers strongly appreciate the newness of
products. Section 1.4 discusses how to estimate the model with simulations. Sec-
tion 1.5 discusses the estimation results, experiments, and a counterfactual analysis.
Finally, section 1.6 is devoted to conclusions.
1.2 Golf Drivers Market and Preference for Newness
In this section, we discuss the observed dynamic behavior of the market and
address empirical questions in regard to consumers’ strong preferences for newness of
products.
Figure 1.1 (a) exhibits the time path of total sales of drivers in US market from
2005 to 2009.5 Apparently, strong seasonality in the volume of sales exists. Each
summer shows high volume of sales as it is the high season for playing golf. December
depicts a small but sharp peak in each year. It mainly comes from low price by big
year-end sale as described below. The figure also depicts a downward long-term trend
of sales throughout the five-year span, suggesting evidence of the US economy going
slow toward the late-2000s. Figure 1.1 (b) is each brand’s total sales ordered by
5Monthly model-by-model sales data are obtained from a market research company specializing
in golf industry. They collect actual sales data from approximately 600 green grass pro shops and
250 off-course shops, including stores from national chains, national franchises, individual owners
with multiple locations and individual owner single-unit stores.
4
volume of sales. Seven major brands occupy 90.5 percent of total sales in this period,
where top two players take 48 percent of the total. The fact that leading brands
dominate the market sales suggests that the brand-related prestige effect exits in this
market. Hence we will focus on seven dominant brands when we deal with brand-
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Figure 1.2: Herfindahl-Hirschman Index: 2005-2009
5
Figure 1.2 plots the Herfindahl-Hirschman index during the sample period to show
the level of market concentration. Although it seems that the market is concentrated
to a few top selling firms in Figure 1.1 (b), the US golf drivers market in this period
































Figure 1.4: Number of Models Available in
a Month
Figure 1.3 is the average price of all drivers available in the US market, weighted
by their sales.6 Generally, prices are high during the golf season (in the summer) and
lower in the winter, around December in particular. The high average price in the
summer is obtained because companies launch new models in the beginning of the
golf season. On the other hand, the low average price in December accounts for the
year-end discount and sale, which leads to high volume of sales in December. Figure
1.4 plots the number of available models in each month. The number of models
typically grows within each year, reflecting the fact that new models are launched in
the middle of each year.
As a caveat, truncation issues exist in the data. First, the number of models seems
6Average price data are collected from various sources. Due to confidentiality, annual model-by-
model average point-of-sales prices and monthly total average price over all available driver models
in each month are provided by the company that allowed to use sales data. Collected prices are
validated to match comparably what the company provided.
6
Figure 1.5: Sales of Drivers Launched by a
Company Figure 1.6: Average Price and Sales
lower than what exists in reality. It is because we only consider models identified in
the data. Other models in the market are not traced since they exhibit too low sales,
they are clone golf drivers, and so forth. However, we consider second-hand markets
are separated from the new golf drivers market and hence clone and used drivers are
not in our interest. Second, once time hits the end of each year, the number of models
drops in Figure 1.4. It is because the data for some models available in a year are
no longer collected in the following year, when they are not successful in particular.
The feature of the market, however, curtails the effect of truncation. Every year
major brands launch new models and the older models’ sales drop fast in response.
Moreover, the data are collected across years for the same model when they have
sufficient sales. Consequently, the data show small sales values at the end tails of
models on which the tracking stopped before the end of sample period. See Figure
1.5 to find the low tail values of model R1 and model R2.
Figure 1.5 is a representative time trend of sales of drivers launched by a company.
Model names are ordered by their launching date. While the seasonality shown in
Figure 1.1 withstands, it shows an evidence of a cannibalization effect: when a new
product is introduced, sales of older models are adversely affected and sales of the
latest one drops fast in particular. Putting cannibalizing behavior aside, we also
observe a downward movement of sales even without the interference of introductions,
7
i.e. the aging effect. Together with fast declining price path of each driver, the
intertemporal competition between new and old models poses an interesting empirical
question: do consumers have strong preferences for a driver’s newness?
Another empirical question to verify is if consumers depreciate a product over
time or not. Figure 1.6 displays the time paths of average price and average sales
since the inception of each model. The declining price path shows a typical dynamic
behavior of a new durable goods market. Data show that the price of a model drops
over time with varying rate depending on how the model is appreciated in the market.
Generally, the price path declines fast in response to sluggish sales in early periods
after introduction, and vice versa. The time path of sales also demonstrates a typical
pattern of a new durable goods market: sales increase initially and decline generally
as time elapses. Observing dynamic behavior of price and sales, many of previous
literature deal with a product’s age, defined as the time elapsed from the product’s
first inception in the market, in modeling demand. The assumption behind using the
age as a product characteristic is that consumers feel a product less attractive as time
elapsed from its first appearance in the market, leading to the significant drop in price
and sales over time. Refer to Hui (2004) and Hitsch (2006) for recent applications
that are close to our model.
Finally, Table 1.1 displays the estimation results of hedonic regression. The de-
pendent variable is the price in log scale. The explanatory variables, newness and
age are as defined above. The quality measure, head size, is in cc divided by 460.
The dummy for golf season has value 1 for May-September and 0 for the rest of the
year. Also, the premium of seven major brands are considered. With all highly sig-
nificant estimated coefficients the hedonic regression results suggest consumers’ do
have preferences for newness. Moreover, the results suggest that it is worth while
to examine the aging effect, products’ quality difference, seasonality in demand, and
heterogeneous brand premium.
8
Table 1.1: Hedonic Estimation Results













Note: The dependent variable is the price ($) in log scale. Newness variable is defined
as an indicator that has value 1 if a product is the latest model of its brand, and 0
otherwise. Age is the time elapsed since the model is first introduced in the market,
in year scale. Head size is in cc divided by 460.
The findings from the market suggest a dynamic modeling of demand. Consumers
have intertemporal trade-offs when they make a purchasing decision. Consumers
seem to care about newness of products when they make a purchase, an incentive to
purchase a new product promptly. On the other hand, expecting price drops in the
future and introduction of a new model that can fit better her taste, each consumer
has an incentive to wait until the next period instead of paying more at this period.
1.3 The Model
1.3.1 Demand
We denote each product as j and its brand as b. Let J bt and Bt be the set of
available products of brand b at time t and available brands at time t, respectively.
Denote all available products in the market, regardless of their brands, at time t as
Jt so that Jt = ∪b∈BtJ bt . We introduce the “outside” product, an option for each
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consumer not to buy any of available products. Without loss of generality, denote
the outside brand and product to be b = j = 0.
Consumers make an intertemporal choice: purchasing decision is not only what to
choose but when to buy. During each period, consumers who have not purchased a
product decide whether to buy one or not among those available in the market. They
get the chance to make a same decision in the following period if they decide not to
buy any. If they buy one, they leave the market. This assumption is reasonable for a
short sample period in a durable goods market: once they buy a durable good they
use it for several periods. Returning a purchased product within a term is considered
as non-purchase of a product. The benefit of this assumption exceeds the loss of
omitting possibilities of repeated purchases: the utility obtained from purchasing a
product is maintained throughout the lifetime, and consumers’ behavior other than
intertemporal purchasing decision is ruled out, e.g. upgrading a driver and reselling
the purchased driver in a secondary used market. Even though the possibility of
upgrading a driver is ruled out, we allow golfers’ skill level or taste may vary over
time. For example, a golfer generally prefers a driver with sharper accuracy to one
with higher forgiveness as the skill level increases.
Consumers are aware of all available products’ characteristics including specifica-
tions, prices, brand names, ages, and whether they are the brand’s latest model or
not. Consumers compare all available models based on their own taste, i.e. golfers
test drivers and choose the one that meets their needs best.
Let Ωit denote the set of all state variables affecting consumer i’s purchase decisions
at time t. Then we let U(Ωit) be the value function for a consumer i at state Ωit that
contains all relevant information regarding purchasing and timing decision. Also, let
uijt be her lifetime utility given by product j purchased at time t. A consumer who







uijt, ui0t + βE[U(Ωi,t+1)|Ωit]
}
, (1.1)
where β is the common discount factor shared by all consumers. So the consumer
who has not owned a product chooses to purchase product j if and only if both the
following conditions hold: 1) the expected overall lifetime utility she would get at
time t by purchasing product j is the maximum of all those from j′ ∈ Jt, and 2) it
is higher than a reservation value, βE[U(Ωi,t+1)|Ωit], plus the utility generated from
buying no product denoted as ui0t.
Let dijt be the choice variable of consumer i having value 1 if she chooses product
j at time t, and 0 otherwise. Accordingly, if dijt = 1 then dij′t = 0 for all available
j′ = j including the outside good. From the setting we have in the value function
(1.1), if dijt = 1 for j = 0, consumer i receives uijt and leaves the market at time t. If
di0t = 1, consumer i has another chance to make a purchasing decision at time t+ 1.




where Lj is the alternative-specific operator defined by
LjU(Ωit) = uijt, for all j = 1, . . . , |Jt|,
L0U(Ωit) = ui0t + βE[U(Ωi,t+1)|Ωit, di0t = 1]. (1.3)
It is well-known that if a solution to the problem (1.2) exists then it is unique, e.g.
Rust (1994).
The unobservable (to an econometrician) characteristics of products are separated
into two groups: vertical and horizontal characteristics, denoted as ξjt and ζjt, re-
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spectively. The vertical characteristics summarize quality-related characteristics of a
product, e.g. durability and maintenance cost. The horizontal characteristics include
all features dependent upon consumers’ taste: due to consumers’ diverse taste or skill
level most of product characteristics falls in this category, e.g. hitting distance, for-
giveness, and controllability of a driver. In a horizontal manner, each consumer has
her own optimal taste on products, denoted as ζit in a same taste space that ζjt lies on.
Here ζit is unobservable to an econometrician as well. Let d(ζit, ζjt) be the economic
distance between consumer i’s optimal taste and product j’s taste characteristics.
Then εijt := h(d(ζit, ζjt)) is a decreasing function of d(ζit, ζjt) such that h(0) = ∞
and h(∞) = −∞. This setup allows us to transform consumers’ heterogeneity in
taste into a vertical measure in a Hotelling sense: each consumer pays the traveling
cost which is proportional to the distance from her location, i.e. her optimal taste,
to a shop, i.e. a product’s characteristics.
We define the newness of product j at time t, denoted as njt, as an indicator
variable equal to 1 if product j is the brand’s latest model at time t and 0 otherwise.
It is distinguished from a product’s age: even though a model was launched long ago,
it may still be the latest model made by its brand, and vice versa. We assume the
lifetime utility generated by purchasing product j to be as follows:
uijt(xjt, njt, pjt, Zt, ξjt, εijt; θ
d)
= α0 + xjtαxi + λinjt + αsiZt − αpi log pjt + ξjt + εijt, for all i, j, t. (1.4)
Here, xjt is a length-K (row) vector of observed characteristics of product j at time
t, pjt is the price of product j at time t, Zt is the marketwise seasonality variable that
accounts for golf season, and εijt is a stochastic term for taste characteristics defined
as above. All the parameters on demand side are summarized in θd, including α and
λ. Verifying if λi > 0 is an important empirical question of this study. A positive
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estimate of λi represents the estimated amount of prestige effect that newness of a
product brings to consumer i.
The way njt is set up (being independent of rivals’ launching behavior in partic-
ular) resembles how consumers really choose the right driver for them. Many golfers
are only interested in the latest models of all (or several) brands. They do not prefer
a driver launched by brand A last month to one introduced by brand B three months
ago simply because that was launched two months later. Within brand umbrella,
however, consumers do take the newness into account.
Following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), hereafter BLP, we introduce the
random utility setting:
uijt(xjt, njt, pjt, Zt, ξjt, εijt; θ
d)
= α0 + xjtαx + λnjt + αsZt − αp log pjt + ξjt+
K∑
k=1







νkαxi for all k = 1, . . . , K,
αsi = αs + σαsναsi, αpi = αp + σαpναpi and λi = λ+ σλνλi,
where (ναxi1, . . . , ναxiK , ναsi, ναpi, νλi) are unobserved consumer heterogeneity. The
utility from not buying any of the products, ui0t, is similarly given by
ui0t = σ0ν0i + εi0t, for all i, t. (1.6)
We set σ0 = 0, which is equivalent to normalizing the utility from the outside good
to zero.
Let us decompose the lifetime utility into two parts: one is the same for all
13
consumers (mean utility, δjt) and the other is consumer-specific term varying by
consumers’ taste (μijt.) Then we can rewrite the random utility setup in formula
(1.5) as
uijt = δjt(xjt, njt, Zt, pjt; θ
d
1) + μijt(xjt, njt, Zt, pjt; θ
d
2) + εijt, (1.7)
where





σαxkναxikxjkt + σλνλinjt + σαsναsiZt − σαpναpi log pjt.
Accordingly, the parameters in demand side θd are also decomposed into two parts:
the product-specific demand parameters along with seasonality, θd1 = (α, λ), and the
consumer-specific ones, θd2 = (σα, σλ).
To separate out the effect of the seasonality, we consider another decomposition
of life time utility.
uijt = δ
0




ijt(xjt, njt, pjt; θ
d
2) + (αs + σαsναsi)Zt + εijt, (1.8)
where
δ0jt := δjt − αsZt and μ0ijt := μijt − σαsναsiZt.
Notice that the seasonality affects all available products equally.
Solving the general dynamic programming problem (1.2) is very difficult. It is
almost impossible to solve the transition probability of the state space Ωit precisely
if its dimension is big. We therefore assume the followings, to specify the utility in a
computationally tractable way:
Assumption I.1 (transformation of uniform taste shocks). Assume that ζit and ζjt
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are independent and are uniformly distributed on interval (0,1). Let h be a monotone
continuous function on (0,1) such that h(x) = − log(− log(1− x)2).
Assumption I.1 gives that εijt are distributed iid according to Type I extreme value
distribution over i, j.7 Along with assuming εi0t follows same distribution as εijt, it is
well-known that the difference of two εijt’s follows the logistic distribution: refer to
Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) pp. 39-40. The logit specification renders the
probability that a consumer will purchase any product, or participate in the market,
does not depend on which product will be purchased. Rather, it is only determined











= αsiZt + r
0
it, (1.9)
7The sketch of proof is as follows: Let Ξ(1) := min{ζit, ζjt} and Ξ(2) := max{ζit, ζjt} where ζit
and ζjt are independent and uniformly distributed in (0,1). Also, let the distance between ζit and
ζjt be D := |ζit − ζjt| = Ξ(2) − Ξ(1). Then the density for joint order statistic is obtained as
fΞ(1),Ξ(2)(x1, x2) = 2.
See Casella and Berger (2001) pp.233-234 for the proof of above joint density. To find the probability
of having Ξ(1) and Ξ(2) within some interval d, we need to integrate over all (permissible) starting




fΞ(1),Ξ(2)(x1, x1 + d)dx1 = 2(1− d).

















= exp(−x) exp (− exp(−x))
which is the density of standard Type I extreme value distribution.
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As discussed in Rust (1994), we assume the well-known conditional independence
to make the transition probability of each consumer’s state space, P(Ωi,t+1|Ωit), com-
putationally tractable by reducing the dimension of Ωit:
Assumption I.2 (conditional independence). Assume that the demand-side state
space is partitioned into observable and unobservable components, Ωit = (rit, εit), and
the unobserved state variable is time specific and does not affect future states.
In Assumption I.2, εit denotes the state variable observed by consumer i but
unobserved by an econometrician. We then have
P(Ωi,t+1|Ωit) = P(ri,t+1, εi,t+1|rit, εit) = P(ri,t+1|rit) · P(εi,t+1). (1.10)
Song and Chintagunta (2003), for example, rely on the same assumption in dealing
with new product adoption of heterogeneous and forward-looking consumers. Using
the relation between the (overall) inclusive value, rit, and the inclusive value net of
seasonality, r0it, in (1.9), we can rewrite the transition probability (1.10) as
P(Ωi,t+1|Ωit) = P(r0it+1, Zt+1|r0it, Zt) · P(εit+1)
= P(r0it+1|r0it) · P(Zt+1|Zt) · P(εit+1). (1.11)
We assume that the transition of seasonality P(Zt+1|Zt) is given deterministically
to all consumers. Then what remains to understand is the transition of the observable
inclusive value net of seasonality r0it over time. To facilitate the computation, we make
an assumption on the transition of inclusive value proposed by Melnikov (2001):
Assumption I.3 (Markov property). The inclusive value net of seasonality r0it follows
a 1st-order Markov process.
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Assumption I.3 makes r0it the sufficient statistic for the distribution of r
0
i,t+1: the
distribution of future inclusive value r0i,t+1 depends only on the current value r
0
it and
does not depend on any past values of r0is for all s < t. Assumption I.3 is rationalized
when many products are available in the market. When there are sufficiently large
number of products in the market, the effect of an individual firm’s pricing and
introducing decision on the inclusive value is negligible. Many previous studies in
dynamic demand models rely on this type of assumption in reducing computational
burden: see Hendel and Nevo (2006), Carranza (2010), Zhao (2008), Gowrisankaran
and Rysman (2011), and Conlon (2010) for applications.
Under Assumptions I.2 and I.3, an active consumer who is still in the market
does not have to keep track of all past behaviors in the market. Rather, she makes
a purchasing decision based on the realized current inclusive value since Ωit ≡ rit.
(see Aguirregabiria and Mira, 2010, for details.)8 The unobservable state variable εit
that does not contribute to the transition of state can be handled in a time specific
manner. Denote the expected continuation value as
U
0
i,t+1(Ωit) := E[U(Ωi,t+1)|Ωit, di0t = 1]
= E[U(ri,t+1)|rit, di0t = 1] = U0i,t+1(rit). (1.12)
By virtue of the extreme value specification, we have the solution to the dynamic
8A more realistic assumption would be consumers update their beliefs on the probability of intro-
duction and product characteristics of future models in a Bayesian manner, e.g. Jiang, Manchandab,
and Rossi (2009). Bayesian approach, however, is not within the scope of this study. Furthermore,
Bayesian updating may not be reliable with fairly short sample periods.
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(δj,t+1 + μij,t+1 + E[εij,t+1|rit, di0t = 1])P(dij,t+1 = 1|rit, di0t = 1)




(δj,t+1 + μij,t+1 + γ − log P(dij,t+1 = 1|rit, di0t = 1))P(dij,t+1 = 1|rit, di0t = 1)
+ (βE[U(ri,t+2)|rit, di0,t+1 = 1] + γ − log P(di0,t+1 = 1|rit, di0t = 1))




(δj,t+1 + μij,t+1 − log P(dij,t+1 = 1|rit, di0t = 1))P(dij,t+1 = 1|rit, di0t = 1)
+ (βE[U(ri,t+2)|rit, di0,t+1 = 1]− log P(di0,t+1 = 1|rit, di0t = 1))
× P(di0,t+1 = 1|rit, di0t = 1) (1.13)
where γ  0.5772 is Euler’s constant, see for example Eckstein and Wolpin (1989)
and Ali (2008) for related discussions. The transition probability for j = 0 is














whereas the transition probability for the outside good is




where r̃i,t+1 is the predicted inclusive value of consumer i after she observed the
realized inclusive value at time t, rit. The realized ri,t+1 and the conjectured r̃i,t+1
are not necessarily equal. In particular, they are different when new models are














































































From the specification we made, the market share of product j at time t is obtained
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by aggregating the individual probability of choices such that
sjt =
∫









where Gνi denotes the distribution of νi. Accordingly, the demand for product j at
time t is obtained by
qjt
(





P(dijt = 1|rt)dGνi (ν), (1.18)
where Mt is the total number of active consumers in the market who have not pur-
chased a product. It is obtained by taking the exogenous number of potential con-
sumers, namely M0t , and subtracting those who have purchased at least a product in
all previous periods.
1.3.2 Remarks on supply
We do not present the model for firms in this study. However, a few remarks are
in order. First, firms’ decisions relevant to our demand model includes pricing and
introduction decision. Without firms’ explicit introduction decisions, the model would
not be able to perform a counterfactual analysis in view of the pace of model changes.
Second, strategic behavior of firms has to be incorporated in the model. In making
pricing and introducing decisions firms take rivals’ decisions into account. In order to
avoid complexity in dynamic modeling, previous literature rely on rather controversial
assumptions that result in static and/or monopolistic pricing. Incorporating firms’
heterogeneity and forward-looking behavior, assumptions in recent literature are still
limited to depend solely on demand states, e.g. Zhao (2008) and Conlon (2010).
Third, the challenges in modeling firms’ dynamic behavior also includes the unknown
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cost structure. In most cases, cost information is not available to researchers and it
is to be recovered. Dealing with both pricing and introduction decisions, the supply
model should explain both marginal and introduction costs. Fourth, the choice of




Let mt be an indicator variable that has value 1 if t is a month in golf season,
and 0 otherwise. In this study, the golf season is set from May to September. The
seasonality variable is then the present discounted value of all future mt’s since uijt
is the lifetime utility. For example, the present discounted value of all future mt’s in





= mt + βmt+1 + β
2mt+2 + β
3mt+3 + . . .
= (1 + β + β2 + β3 + β4) + (β12 + β13 + β14 + β15 + β16) + . . .
= (1 + β + β2 + β3 + β4) + β12(1 + β + β2 + β3 + β4) + . . .
= (1 + β + β2 + β3 + β4)(1 + β12 + (β12)2 + . . .)
=
1 + β + β2 + β3 + β4
1− β12 =: B (1.19)
Similarly, one can easily calculate Zt for all other months and the results are shown
in Table 1.2. The months in bold represent the golf season.
Of course, we can think of another setup that depicts a small peak in each Decem-
ber in Figure 1.1 (a). However, the baseline model assumes the above to demonstrate
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Table 1.2: Present Discounted Value of Seasonality
month Zt month Zt month Zt
January β4B May B September 1 + β8B
February β3B June (1 + β + β2 + β3) + β11B October β7B
March β2B July (1 + β + β2) + β10B November β6B
April βB August (1 + β) + β9B December β5B
Note: Months in bold indicate the golf season. Zt is the marketwise seasonality and β
is the monthly discount factor same across all consumers. B is solely dependent to β.
See equation (1.19) for its derivation.
the effect of golf season on seasonality. An experiment is performed in Section 1.5
that accommodates the year-end high demand to the seasonality.
1.4.2 Markov process of r0it
Under Assumption I.3, we introduce the AR(1) model, i.e. a Markov process, to
specify the transition of the inclusive value net of seasonality as follows:
r0i,t+1 = η0i + η1ir
0
it + εit, where ε ∼ N (0, σ2r). (1.20)
Then as t→ t+ 1 the seasonality value is updated while r̃0i,t+1 = Eitr0i,t+1 is obtained
from (1.20), i.e.
r̃i,t+1 = η0i + η1ir
0
it + (Zt+1 − Zt)(αs + σsνis). (1.21)
1.4.3 Triple layers of estimation loops
To make the integration in (1.17) tractable, we take the simulation approach:
we draw (ν1i , . . . , ν
K
i , νλi, ναi), i = 1, . . . , N from the standard multivariate normal
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distribution. The approximated market share is then given by
s̃jt
(














where ϕit is the “density” of consumer i at time t. At t = 1, ϕi1 = 1 and for













For estimating demand, we adopt an algorithm similar to that used in BLP. The
difference to BLP is that the demand equation (1.18) accounts for a nonconstant
continuation values and a time-varying distribution of consumers’ characteristics. The
estimation algorithm has three loops to converge. 1) Given a pre-specified θd, the
continuation value at steady state U0i∞ is obtained. Then all previous continuation
values, U0i,t+1, t = 1, . . . , T , are successively obtained from (1.16) and (1.21). 2) Using
the obtained continuation values U0i,t+1, t = 1, . . . , T , we calculate the simulated
market share and match it with observed market share. 3) Finally, a new set of
values of θd is searched. These three loops are run until they all converge. Below is
the detailed descriptions of each estimation loop.
[Outer-loop] Since we do not have information beyond the sample period, we
assume that U0i,T+1 = U
0
i,T+2 = . . . = U
0
i∞. Given a pre-specified θ
d, we can obtain
the stationary continuation value using
U
0










iT + (ZT+1 − ZT )(αs + σsνis)) + exp(βU0i∞)
]
. (1.23)
Using (1.16) and (1.21), all previous continuation values are successively calculated
from U0i,T+1 = U
0
i∞. With the pre-specified θ
d and obtained U0i,t+1 for t = 1, . . . , T ,
the simulated market share (1.22) is calculated.
[Middle-loop ] Given the predicted (or simulated) market share (1.22) with the
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pre-specified values of the demand parameters θd, each of implied mean utility level
δjt is numerically obtained using the fixed point algorithm proposed in BLP. At each
iteration (iter), the value of the mean utility at time t δ
(iter)





jt + log s
obs
jt − log s̃jt(δ(iter)jt ; θd) (1.24)
where sobsjt is the observed market share whereas s̃jt is the simulated share as specified
in the equation (1.22). Under a certain regularity condition, the algorithm guarantees
a unique solution by the contraction mapping theorem. Carranza (2010) shows 0 ≤
∂βU0it/∂rit < 1 is a sufficient condition for the regularity conditions to guarantee the
algorithm has a unique interior fixed point.
[Inner-loop] After the middle-loop converges, the new values of parameters θd are
searched by matching the new simulated share value s̃jt(δ
(iter+1)
jt ; θ
d) with the observed
market share s0jt. In this step, efficient and consistent estimates are obtained by the
two-step GMM method. To control the endogeneity of price, the product-specific
demand parameters θd1 is estimated by 2SLS using adequate instruments including
the average age of rivals’ models and the average head size of them. The iterations
are repeated until all three loops converge.
1.5 Estimation Results and Discussion
1.5.1 Baseline model
Monthly sales and average price data are collected model-by-model for 61 time
periods: December 2004 to December 2009. Prices are in dollar unit and are deflated
by the December 2009 Consumer Price Index (CPI) value. Total of 103 driver models
across 22 brands are included to constitute total of 1,922 data points. The observed
product characteristics are set to be xjt = (ajt, hsizej , DBj), where ajt is the age







































Figure 1.7: Seasonality in Each Month (Zt)
Note: Zt is the marketwise seasonality and the monthly discount factor β is set at
0.992.
by 460, the maximal size permitted by USGA as discussed in Section 1.2, and DBj
is a vector of brand dummies. Observed the total sales by brand shown in Figure
1.1 (b), the brand dummy vector includes top seven brands in sales: Taylormade,
Callaway, Ping, Cobra, Cleveland, Nike, and Titleist. The indicator for newness njt
is as defined in Section 1.3. The monthly discount factor is set at β = 0.992, which
yields the seasonality Zt in each month as shown in Figure 1.7.
Table 1.3 shows the descriptive statistics of product characteristics in xjt. While
the head size of drivers are clustered close to 460cc, the newness, age, and price have
sufficient variability. Correlation coefficient between newness and age is -0.473 which
shows natural negative but not too close correlation between them.
Table 1.4 displays the estimation results of the baseline model. The simulation
of market share is performed by 10,000 random draws. In the mean utility portion
of θd1 , the estimate for the newness (λ) is of ours special interest and is expected to
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Table 1.3: Descriptive Statistics of Mean Utility Shifters
Mean Std. Dev. Observations
newness (njt) 0.463 0.499 1,922
age (ajt) 1.237 0.896 1,922
head size (hsizej) 0.960 0.066 1,922
price (pjt) 208.76 118.95 1,922
Note: Newness variable is defined as an indicator that has value 1 if a product is the
latest model of its brand, and 0 otherwise. Age is the time elapsed since the model is
first introduced in the market, in year scale. Head size is in cc divided by 460. Price
is in dollar unit.
be significantly positive if consumers have strong preference for newness, i.e. they
are willing to pay more for the latest model over the same brand’s outdated ones.
We expect the estimate of parameter for age (αa) to be negative if consumers in fact
depreciate a model over time. Also, the parameter for head size (αh) is anticipated
to have a positive estimate when the consumers do observe the bigger driver head
as a higher quality. Each estimate of brand dummy parameters (αb) is expected to
have positive values if consumers care and are willing to pay more for the drivers
made by a major brand assigned to the dummy. In general they would have some
order comparable to the ranking of aggregated sales shown in Figure 1.1 (b) but not
necessarily. Finally, the estimate of price parameter (αp) has to be positive as the
way it is formulated.
The signs of λ̂, α̂a, α̂h, and α̂p are obtained highly significantly as expected. Most
importantly, the estimate λ̂ measures the amount of prestige effect effectively. The
estimated α̂b’s are overall ordered by the ranking in total sales except Titleist with a
comparable value to Callaway. It suggests that the top four brands in the US drivers
market are Taylormade, Ping, Callaway, and Titleist in the sense of brand premium
that consumers recognize. Also, the second tier group consists of Cobra, Cleveland,
and Nike in the same sense.
The demand parameters of consumer heterogeneity, θd2 , are precisely estimated for
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Table 1.4: Estimation Results: Baseline Model
Baseline Model
Variable Estimate Std. Err.
Mean Utility (δ)
(constant) α0 6.945 1.677
newness λ 0.327 0.064
age αa -0.825 0.153
head size αh 1.065 0.528
seasonality αs 1.452 0.026
Taylormade αtaylormadeb 3.177 0.164
Callaway αcallawayb 2.275 0.112
Ping αpingb 2.377 0.105
Cobra αcobrab 1.682 0.095
Cleveland αclevelandb 1.641 0.097
Nike αnikeb 1.630 0.107
Titleist αtitleistb 2.265 0.144
price αp 1.450 0.311
Consumer Heterogeneity (μ)
newness σλ 0.894 0.243
age σa 0.029 0.010
head size σh 0.092 0.043
seasonality σs 0.299 0.127
price σp 0.296 0.036
Note: Mean utility δjt is same across all consumers. All parameters are expected to
have positive signs except age. Consumer heterogeneity is individual-specific variations
on variables in the mean utility except brand dummies.
drivers’ age, head size, newness, and price. The heterogeneity for brand dummies σb
are not included in estimation. The estimation results with σb are obtained almost
identical to those in Table 1.4 while only σ̂b are all small and insignificant at 5%
level, meaning no significant evidence can be found that consumers’ heterogeneous
perception on brand premium is diverse.
Table 1.5 exhibits the calculated dollar values of product characteristics and brand
dummies for a representative consumer, i.e. consumers’ heterogeneity is ignored.
Each dollar value is the percentage change in price that makes consumers remain
indifferent before and after a certain change in a variable when other things are equal.
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Table 1.5: Dollar Values of Characteristics: Baseline Model
Variable Change in Variable % Changes in Price
Product Characteristics
newness λ njt : 0 → 1 0.2530
age αa ajt : a→ a+ 112 -0.0486









Note: The numbers in the rightmost column are percent changes in price induced by
the change in corresponding variables. Brand values are compared to minor brands
with zero values of all brand dummies. In calculating the dollar values, a representative
consumer is considered by ignoring consumers’ heterogeneity.
Having newness solely induces 25.3 percent increase in price. A driver’s price should
fall by 4.9 percent in each month to compensate the aging effect when other things
are kept equal. An increase of 10cc in head size corresponds to 1.6 percent increase in
price. Among the product characteristics, the premium of newness stands out in its
dollar value. The second part of Table 1.5 shows that having one of the major brand
names induces price increase to a great extent. All of seven major brands reveal that
more than 200 percent of increase in price compared to minor brands. It is largely
because consumers do care the brand name when they choose a driver, i.e. consumers
believe that brand name signals the quality.
1.5.2 Experiments
In this subsection we perform three experiments. Model I and II experiment with
different consumers’ behavioral assumptions, while model III adopts an approxima-
tion method where the assumptions on consumers’ economic behavior remains same
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as the baseline model.
Model I: Myopic consumers
When consumers are assumed to behave myopically, we force β = 0 for all i and
t. Then the model becomes equivalent to the static BLP model. Note that the
influence of seasonality becomes dichotomous, i.e. Zt = mt. First set of parameter
estimates in Table 1.7 displays the estimation results under the assumption of myopic
consumers. Overall, parameters in mean utility are estimated with the expected signs.
The impact of seasonality is obtained much smaller than the baseline model.
Model II: Quasi-hyperbolic discounting of seasonality with December shock
The dynamic movement of sales in Figure 1.1 (a) shows a consistent cyclical pat-
tern: high demand in summer and small peak in December. To incorporate this
pattern in the model, we make two behavioral assumptions: 1) consumers have time-
inconsistent preferences, i.e. quasi-hyperbolic discounting of seasonality, and 2) con-
sumers have high holiday demand at year-end. In other words, mt = 1 when t is in
December, where all other mt values remain the same as above. The assumption of
quasi-hyperbolic discounting is justified when consumers are in fact present-biased,
i.e. consumers reveal strong tendency to care the current seasonality state. Let π be
an additional discount factor that represents the dynamic inconsistency. The second
assumption is by high holiday demand and/or companies’ promotions at year-end.
For example, Callaway has the “Preferred Retailer Program” that offers the year-end
rebates and discounts for participating retailers, part of which in turn transfers to
consumers. The present discounted value of all future mt’s in May is then obtained
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as




= (1 + πβ + πβ2 + πβ3 + πβ4) + πβ7 + (πβ12 + πβ13 + πβ14 + πβ15 + πβ16) + πβ19 . . .
= (1 + πβ + πβ2 + πβ3 + πβ4) +




= (1 + πβ + πβ2 + πβ3 + πβ4) + πβ12B +
πβ7
1− β12 , (1.25)
where B is defined as in (1.19). Similarly, all other Zt values are calculated in Table
1.6.
Table 1.6: The Present Discounted Value of Seasonality
month Zt
January πβ4B + πβ
11
1−β12
February πβ3B + πβ
10
1−β12
March πβ2B + πβ
9
1−β12
April πβB + πβ
8
1−β12
May (1 + πβ + πβ2 + πβ3 + πβ4) + πβ12B + πβ
7
1−β12
June (1 + πβ + πβ2 + πβ3) + πβ11B + πβ
6
1−β12
July (1 + πβ + πβ2) + πβ10B + πβ
5
1−β12
August (1 + πβ) + πβ9B + πβ
4
1−β12
September 1 + πβ8B + πβ
3
1−β12
October πβ7B + πβ
2
1−β12
November πβ6B + πβ
1−β12
December πβ5B + 1 + πβ
12
1−β12
Note: Months in bold indicate the high demand: golf season and year-end. Zt is the
marketwise seasonality, β is the monthly discount factor is same across all consumers,
and π is an additional discount factor which discounts future utility relative to current
period utility. B is solely dependent to β.
Calibrating π = 0.9 along with β = 0.992, we have the time path of seasonality
















Figure 1.8: Time Path of Seasonality (Zt)
Note: Zt is the marketwise seasonality. The monthly discount factor β is set at 0.992
and an additional discount factor for dynamic inconsistency π is calibrated at 0.9.
rable to what we have in the baseline model shown in Figure 1.7 and the path also
resembles the total sales in Figure 1.1 (a).
The second part of Table 1.7 shows the estimation results of Model II. As expected,
they are much closer to the estimation results of the baseline model than Model I.
Compared to the baseline model, almost all magnitudes of estimates are greater in
Model II.
Model III: Approximation of continuation value a la Carranza (2010)
In this experiment, we adpot the approximation approach in obtaining the con-
tinuation value in (1.3) proposed by Carranza (2010). In order to facilitate the cal-
culation, one can approximate the integral given by equation (1.17) in the following
way: First, since we find the fact that U0i,t+1 is solely dependent to rit, we specify that
βŨ0i,t+1(rit; εit) = η0 + η1εit + η2rit + η3ritεit, (1.26)
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where the unobservable component of state variables, εit ∼ N (0, 1). We set η0 ≡ 0
to identify the constant in the mean utility. Second, we replace U0i,t+1 by Ũ
0
i,t+1
in equation (1.17) and draw εl, l = 1, . . . , L from N (0, 1). For each draw of εl,
we draw (ν1n, . . . , ν
K
n , νλn, ναn), n = 1, . . . , N from the standard multivariate normal
distribution. The approximated market share is then given by
s̃jt
(


































































t is the “density” of consumer n at time t for the lth draw of ε. At
t = 1, ϕ
(n,l)

























. The estimation strat-
egy is same as what we have in section 1.4. Under a certain regularity condition, the
algorithm guarantees a unique solution by the contraction mapping theorem. Car-
ranza (2010) shows 0 ≤ ∂βŨ0i,t+1/∂rit < 1 is a sufficient condition for the regularity
conditions to guarantee the algorithm has a unique interior fixed point.
The last two columns of Table 1.7 show the estimation results of Model III. Though
this approximation approach is less structural than our model, the relative values of
estimates are obtained similarly to the baseline model and Model II. Noticeably, the



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.8: Dollar Values of Characteristics: Experiments
% Changes in Price
Variable Model I Model II Model III
Product Characteristics
newness λ 0.2670 0.2645 0.2549
age αa -0.0442 -0.0449 -0.0415
head size αh 0.0181 0.0171 0.0223
Brand Dummies
Taylormade αtaylormadeb 4.5731 6.8469 3.4060
Callaway αcallawayb 2.3372 3.3857 1.7914
Ping αpingb 2.3388 3.6695 1.7054
Cobra αcobrab 1.2494 1.9681 0.9068
Cleveland αclevelandb 1.1688 1.8515 0.8254
Nike αnikeb 1.3936 1.8867 1.1347
Titleist αtitleistb 2.2736 3.3857 1.7443
Note: The numbers are percent changes in price induced by the change in correspond-
ing variables. Brand values are compared to minor brands with zero values of all brand
dummies. In calculating the dollar values, a representative consumer is considered by
ignoring consumers’ heterogeneity.
Figure 1.9: Dollar Values of Seasonality
Note: Dollar value represents the adjusted percent price to make a representative
consumer equally satisfied as the previous month when other things are held equal.
Positive value means that a representative consumer is willing to pay more in the
corresponding month compared, ceteris paribus, to the previous month, and vice versa.
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Table 1.8 shows the dollar values calculated in the same way as in Table 1.5. In
Model I that assumes myopic consumers, the effect of newness is the highest with
26.7 percent increase in price, while all other dynamic models result in less than 26.5
percent increases in price. Model II resembles the baseline model but less brand effect
is obtained. Model III suggests even lesser brand effect.
Figure 1.9 is the dollar values of seasonality for the baseline model, Model I, and
Model II. Dollar value represents the adjusted percent price to make a representative
consumer equally satisfied as the previous month when other things are held equal.
Positive value hence means that a representative consumer is willing to pay more
in the corresponding month compared, ceteris paribus, to the previous month, and
vice versa. Baseline model shows a dichotomous behavior such that a representative
consumer consistently is willing to pay around 50 percent more in the off season, i.e.
from November to May, and 44 percent less in the peak season, i.e. from June to
October, as time is increased by a month. In other words, during the off season,
consumers are willing to pay more as the golf season comes closer. It agrees with
what companies reveal in regard to seasonality, e.g. Callaway Golf Company Annual
Report 2010 states that
“[t]he Company’s business is subject to seasonal fluctuations (16p.) [B]ecause
of this seasonality, a majority of the Company’s sales and most, if not all,
of its profitability generally occurs during the first half of the year (33p.)”
Model II exhibits similar pattern to the baseline model but higher peaks are ob-
served in May and December and lowest dollar values are obtained in January and
October. Deviations in May and October are due to the assumption of hyperbolic
discounting while those in December and January are as a result of additional season-
ality shock given in December. The myopic model, Model I, suggests much smaller
dollar value of seasonality. Due to the assumption of myopic consumers, the influence
of shifting one month forward is only effective in May and October, the beginning of
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Figure 1.10: Sales of Callaway and Ping: Observed and Counterfactual
Note: Dashed line is the observed total sales of Callaway and Ping and solid line is
the counterfactual total sales when they are merged. Dotted lines denote the 95%
confidence interval of the counterfactual total sales.
golf season and off season, respectively.
From the results found in Table 1.7 and Figure 1.9, the misspecification of the
static model results in the effects of newness and seasonality are smoothed out. It is
because the denominator in equations (1.17) and (1.22) do not account for the hetero-
geneous continuation value of utility, i.e. exp(rit)+exp(βU
0
i,t+1) becomes exp(rit)+1.
1.5.3 A simple counterfactual analysis: merger of Callaway and Ping
To see the impact of consumers’ preferences for newness, we perform a counter-
factual analysis with two firms ranked second and third in total sales shown in Figure
1.1 (b), namely Callaway and Ping. Consider they are merged before the sample
period and do business under the brand of Callaway. The impact of merger is higher
frequency of model changes. In our model, it yields the modification of newness val-
ues. In other words, consumers observe more frequent introductions of new Callaway
models after merger and the existing models lose newness faster than before. We
assume the pricing decisions of two firms remain same as observed. Figure 1.10 plots
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the observed total sales of Callaway and Ping, and the counterfactual total sales when
they are assumed to be merged. Overall, the sales are reduced when they are merged.
In particular, the loss in sales is more conspicuous when they have relatively high
frequency of introductions, in the summer of 2005, 2006 and 2009. It suggests that
the cannibalization effect in sales plays more significant role when the model changes
are made faster than observed, i.e. optimal pace of model changes.
1.6 Concluding Remarks
In this study, we identified consumers’ preferences for newness of products and
measured the amount of prestige effect that the newness of a product brings. With
strong preferences for newness of products, forward-looking heterogeneous consumers
are modeled to behave time optimally in their purchasing decision. The deterministic
transition of seasonality is also modeled. Estimation results show the evidence of
strong preference for newness, depreciation with respect to age, and brand premium.
Experiments with behavioral assumptions and approximation confirm the robustness
of the results. A simple counterfactual analysis shows the negative effect on two
firms’ total sales when they are assumed to be merged. It is due to the faster loss of
newness in some products after merger. While emphasizing on consumers’ preferences
for newness of products, this study omits modeling firms’ pricing, introduction, and
endogenous choice of product characteristics.
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CHAPTER II
A Grouped Mixed Proportional Hazard Model
with Social Interactions: The Passage of the
Motorcycle-Helmet-Use Law
2.1 Introduction
The main purpose of this chapter1 is to understand the decision making mecha-
nism of state legislations and, in particular, to find an evidence that the coverage of
motorcycle-helmet-use law, hereafter MHU law, in a state is spatially dependent on
neighboring states’ status or decisions.
To analyze such a social interaction aspect in state legislation decision making,
we specify a discrete choice model with social interactions as Brock and Durlauf
(2001a,b), which incorporates the social interaction term in the random utility max-
imization problem. Individual expectation to others’ decision is the key component
deriving the social interactions. In this particular example, however, each decision
making can be only realized at certain times, such as only when there is a legislate
meeting (i.e. timing friction in decision realization.) By introducing such timing
friction in the discrete choice model, similarly as the job searching model of Lan-
caster (1979), we derive a hazard model with duration dependence. In particular, we
1This chapter is a joint essay with Yoonseok Lee.
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introduce a grouped mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model (e.g. Kalbfleisch and
Prentice, 1973; Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978) with social interactions, where the haz-
ard rate is a function of other states’ discrete choices (e.g. Carruthers, Guinnane, and
Lee, 2012). The baseline hazard and the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity
are specified nonparametrically (e.g. Heckman and Singer, 1984; Meyer, 1990, 1995;
Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978). The EM-algorithm is used to facilitate the estimation
of the MPH model with social interactions (e.g. Lee, 2007).
Estimation results using U.S. state-level panel data from 1975 to 2006 show sta-
tistically significant interactions with neighboring states’ decisions on the MHU law,
whereas safety concern is found not to be important when the policy makers make
decisions. Though this analysis does not give an answer to an issue whether intro-
ducing the mandatory MHU law is beneficial or not, it explains a behavioral aspect
of the legislative decision making procedure in the context of social interactions and
empirically shows how the proximity between agents affects the decision making.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
main model, discrete choice with social interactions and timing friction in decision
realization. Section 2.3 develops a mixed proportional hazard model with grouped
data, that includes both the interaction term and the unobserved heterogeneity, and
provides econometric foundation of the choice model. Section 2.4 introduces the EM
algorithm as an estimation method. Section 2.5 delineates the data and discusses the
estimated results. Section 2.6 concludes the chapter with some remarks. Technical
details are provided in the Appendix B.
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2.2 Discrete Choice with Social Interactions
2.2.1 Random utility maximization
We consider individuals i = 1, . . . , n who can switch their choices over time t =
1, . . . , T . The binary choice is denoted by an indicator variable di(t), which has
support {−1, 1}. The observed characteristics of each individual i, possibly time-
varying, are denoted as a k × 1 vector xi(t). The unobservable independent random
private utility (or a random shock) is denoted by εi(t, di(t)), which depends on the
realized individual’s choice and is independent of xi(t) for all i and t.
Similarly as Brock and Durlauf (2001a,b), we impose social interactions in the in-
dividual decision by assuming that the expected behavior of others influence each indi-
vidual choice. Examples are spill-over effects, externalities and peer-effects. More pre-
cisely, we assume a twice-differentiable instantaneous individual utility function given
by V (di(t), xi(t), μ
e
i (d−i(t)), εi(t, di(t))), where d−i(t) = (d1(t), . . . , di−1(t), di+1(t), . . .,
dn(t)) denotes the vector of choices other than that of individual i and μ
e
i (d−i(t))
represents individual’s belief concerning the choices of other agents. Given that in-
dividuals are myopic so that they only make choices by comparing current utilities
without considering future paths of choices, each choice is described by solving
max
di(t)∈{−1,1}
V (di(t), xi(t), μ
e
i (d−i(t)), εi(t, di(t))) (2.1)
for each t. Note that myopic behavior can be understood in the context of repeated
search or infinite discount rate, and it well justifies the proportional hazard specifi-
cation (e.g. Van den Berg, 2001).
We assume that the individual utility function can be represented as
V (di(t), xi(t), μ
e
i (d−i(t)), εi(t, di(t))) = u (di(t), xi(t)) + εi(t, di(t)) (2.2)




where u (di(t), xi(t)) and US (di(t), xi(t), μ
e
i (d−i(t))) are observable deterministic pri-
vate and social utilities, respectively. Without the social utility US, (2.2) corresponds
to the standard random utility function. We further let the deterministic private
utility be linear as
u (di(t), xi(t)) = di(t)u1(xi(t)) + u2(xi(t)), (2.3)
which is without loss of generality since it coincides with the original utility function
on the support of the individual choices {−1, 1}. (E.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001b,
p.3307.) The social utility possess a generalized quadratic conformity effect as
US (di(t), xi(t), μ
e









where α is an unknown scalar parameter and Ei,t[·] denotes the conditional expec-
tation of i at t given the values of (di(t), xi(t)). In this specification, αwij(t) =
∂2V/∂di(t)∂Ei,t[dj(t)] = ∂
2US/∂di(t)∂Ei,t[dj(t)] measures the strategic complemen-
tarity between individual choices and the expected choices of others (e.g. Brock and
Durlauf, 2001b; Cooper and John, 1988). The term wij(t) in (2.4) represents the inter-
action weight between agents i and j. For each t, we define wij(t) = g(||ϕi(t), ϕj(t)||)
for i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n, where wii(t) = 0, wij(t) = wji(t) and ||·, ·|| is a proxy of economic
distance between i and j. More precisely, ||·, ·|| is a distance function of a pair of char-
acteristics ϕi(t) and ϕj(t), and g(·) is a nonnegative and strictly increasing function
with g(0) = 0. Note that wij(t) are typically assumed to be fixed and deterministic
for the identification purposes (e.g. Manski, 1993). We implicitly assume that there
is no individual without a neighbor; the choice of neighborhood is also fixed and not
endogenous.
For d2i (t) = 1 we can rewrite (2.4) as α
∑
j =iwij(t)(di(t)Ei,t[dj(t)]−1), and obtain
the values of expectations Ei,t[dj(t)] by assuming that all the agents have rational
41
expectations for each t:
Ei,t [dj(t)] = Et [dj(t)|x1(t), . . . , xn(t);Ek,td(t) for k,  = 1, . . . , n] . (2.5)
The solutions satisfying this self-consistent condition (e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001a)
close the model, provided they exist. Uniqueness of the self-consistent equilibrium
gives the identification condition in this framework. More precisely, from the standard
random utility maximization, individual i chooses di(t) over −di(t) at time t if
V (di(t), xi(t), μ
e
i (d−i(t)), εi(t, di(t))) ≥ V (−di(t), xi(t), μei (d−i(t)), εi(t,−di(t))),
(2.6)
whose probability is given by
P {V (di(t), xi(t), μei (d−i(t)), εi(t, di(t))) ≥ V (−di(t), xi(t), μei (d−i(t)), εi(t,−di(t)))}
= P
{





















where we assume that εi(t,−1) − εi(t, 1) is independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) over i and t with G(·) being the distribution function that is symmetric around
zero. Using this result, the self-consistent solution μ(t) = Ei,t[dj(t)] satisfying (2.5)









which is assumed to exist uniquely, where H(y) = 2G(2y)− 1 for some y ∈ R.
Assumption II.1 (self-consistent equilibrium). Given H(·), u1(xi(t)) and α
∑
j =iwij(t),
there exists a unique self-consistent expectation μ(t) satisfying (2.8) for each t.
Note that the unique existence of the self-consistent equilibrium requires assumptions
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on the distribution G(·) as well as u1(xi(t)) and α
∑
j =iwij(t). For example, when
G is logistic, H(·) = tanh(·) and thus the existence of self-consistent equilibrium in
(2.8) follows immediately (e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001a, Proposition 1). Moreover,
provided that α
∑
j =iwij(t) ≤ 1, which holds if α ≤ 1 under the row normalization
assumption (i.e.
∑
j =iwij(t) = 1 for each i and t) in Assumption II.6, the equilibrium
is unique from the properties of the tanh(·) function. When α∑j =i wij(t) > 1, on
the other hand, the uniqueness can be obtained only when |u1(xi(t))| is large enough
(e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001a, Proposition 2).
2.2.2 Choice with timing frictions
Though we introduce the social interaction term in the choice mechanism, the
random utility analysis in the previous subsection is rather standard since we assume
that each individual is myopic and the utility maximization problem is solved for
each t. There could be the cases, however, that the choice is not allowed for some t
even though the random utility maximization tells so. A passage of a law is a good
example: Let the agent i be the state legislature and the passage of a particular law is
determined by solving the random utility maximization. For some cases, even when
people want to pass the law soon, the number of legislate meetings is limited and
thus there could be a exogenous timing friction in realizing the choice.
To incorporate such an idea into the framework, we suppose that an alarm clock is
assigned to each agent i, where the alarms are independent over time. When the clock
rings, the agent has an opportunity to revise her choice. The choice and the alarm are
mutually independent, and the choice is assumed to be made when the clock rings or
right before at t− = limΔ→0(t−Δ) for Δ > 0. More precisely, we let the occurrence
of alarm follows the time-dependent (or non-homogeneous) Poisson process with rate




ρi(s)ds for each i. We further impose a common factor structure on ρi(t) as
ρi(t) = λ0(t)vi (2.9)
with λ0(t) > 0 and vi > 0, where λ0(t) is the common time-dependent rate across indi-
viduals while the time-invariant (unobservable) heterogeneity vi allows for variations
over i.
If individual i followed the decision rule in (2.6), her revision of the choice is
observed in the short time period [t, t + Δ) with Δ > 0 if and only if (i) her alarm
clock rings at t and (ii) the utility with the new choice exceeds that with the old
one. Apparently, the probability of the evens (i) and (ii) are ρi(t)Δ = λ0(t)viΔ
and G(2[u1(xi(t)) + α
∑
j =iwij(t)Ei,t[dj(t)]]di(t)), respectively from (2.9) and (2.7).
Since these events are assumed to be mutually independent, the probability of choice
revision in [t, t + Δ) conditional on no revision occurred before t is given by their









which is in the form of the mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model with the baseline
hazard function λ0(t) and the unobservable heterogeneity vi (e.g. Lancaster, 1990;
Van den Berg, 2001).
We remark that knowing the characteristic of the choice-change-allowance process
is crucial to correctly identify the choice behavior. For example, suppose we ignore the
choice-change-allowance process and simply observe the choice behaviors at a fixed
frequency. Then for any two identical consecutive choices of individual i, say di(t) =
di(t
′) = 1 for t < t′, we cannot tell which scenario results in such observations among
the followings: (i) di(t
′) = 1 because Vi(t
′, 1) − Vi(t′,−1) > 0, where Vi(t, di(t)) =
V (1, xi(t), μ
e




because the choice revision is not allowed at t′ whether the sign of Vi(t
′, 1)−Vi(t′,−1)
is positive or negative. Particularly when Vi(t
′, 1)− Vi(t′,−1) < 0 but the individual
cannot change her choice because it is not allowed at t′, it violates the fundamentals
of the standard random utility maximization problem.
2.3 Grouped MPH Models with Social Interactions
2.3.1 Semiparametric duration models with grouped data
Though the failure time is continuous, the standard panel data only provide ob-
servations on failure times aggregated up to discrete intervals (i.e. grouped duration
data; e.g. Kalbfleisch and Prentice, 1973; Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978). To handle
this discrepancy, we suppose failure times are grouped into intervals Bs = [bs−1, bs)
for s = 1, 2, . . . , S with b0 = 0 and bS = ∞ without loss of generality, where the
length of each interval corresponds to the panel survey frequency. Survival to time bs
is the same as surviving until the s-th interval Bs (e.g. Sueyoshi, 1995) and the failure
time of individual i in Bs are recorded as τi = s. Since we usually deal with equi-
spaced panel data, we simply let bt = t for all t = 1, . . . , T and consider T intervals:
[0, 1), [1, 2), . . . , [T − 1, T ) ignoring the last interval [T,∞) that is after the survey
period and thus all durations lasting over T are naturally right censored. We further
assume that covariates are at best recorded up to intervals and the values does not
change in each interval [t− 1, t). Following the standard notations of panel data, we
simply rewrite xi(t), wij(t), di(t) as xi,t, wij,t, di,t, respectively, in what follows.
In order to make the empirical analysis tractable, we further impose three more
assumptions. First, we specify u1(xi,t) = x
′
i,tβ for a k × 1 parameter vector β as the
standard discrete choice or the Cox’s (1972) MPH models. Second, the interaction
weight wij,t is time invariant so that it is simply denoted as wij. Since the main
analysis is based on the geographical proximity as a measure of the interaction weights,
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this assumption holds naturally. However, as long as wij,t is predetermined, time
varying weight can be considered. Third, knowing that the renewal of the choice is
not highly frequent in the data set (only 42 revisions are made over 383 time periods,)
we assume that the expectation for neighbors’ current choices is equal to the previous
choices (i.e. Ei,t[dj,t] = dj,t−1 for all j = i and t) similarly as Wallis (1980). Using the
















from (2.10) for all i = 1, . . . , n and t = 1, . . . , T , where φ(y) = G(2y) if the hazard is
from the choice −1 to 1, and φ(y) = 1−G(2y) if it is from 1 to −1.
Heckman and Singer (1984) suggest that the distribution of the unobserved het-
erogeneity vi be nonparametrically estimated in order to avoid any misspecification
problem; as the number of mass points increases, discrete distributions can approxi-
mate any distribution arbitrarily well. The nonparametric estimator, however, is very
sensitive to the assumed shape of the baseline hazard function λ0(t) (e.g. Trussell and
Richards, 1985) especially with single-spell data. For a possible solution, Meyer (1990,
1995) proposes to use piecewise constant baseline hazard functions (e.g. Prentice and
Gloeckler, 1978) as well as the Heckman-Singer approach. More precisely, we let the
baseline hazard λ0(t) be piecewise constant:
λ0(t) = exp (γ) if t ∈ [a−1, a), (2.12)
where 1 = a1 < . . . < ah = T (with h ≤ T ) is a subsequence of t = 1, . . . , T . Such
specification is useful especially when the hazard rate has much fluctuation or frequent
peaks. It extracts common deterministic time trends from the covariates as the stan-
dard time effects in panel regressions. Note that γ satisfies log
∫ a
a−1
λ0 (r) dr = γ





λ0 (r) dr for all t. For the unobserved heterogeneity, we assume vi to be




pj1 {v = qj} , (2.13)
where Evi = 1,
∑m
j=1 pj = 1, 0 < pj < 1 and 0 < qj <∞ for all j = 1, 2, . . . , m. 1{·}
is the binary indicator.
2.3.2 Regularity conditions
Based on the specification (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13) in the previous section, we
consider an MPH model given by








for some known function φ : R → R, where vi is i.i.d. with density given in (2.13)





′. Carruthers, Guinnane, and Lee (2012)
use a similar method with the exponential link function as a particular example of
φ(·). The weighted sum of dj,t−1 by the interaction weights wij can be interpreted as
the average influence of other agents’ past decisions on i that can be understood as
the individual i’s expectation on the others’ behavior or a learning effect. We first
assume the following conditions.
Assumption II.2 (failure time). The failure time τi > 0 is independent across i
conditional on zi,t and vi for each t; τi is independent of the censoring time Ci for all
i.
Assumption II.3 (unobserved heterogeneity). The unobserved heterogeneity vi > 0
is i.i.d. of finite mixture (2.13) with Evi = 1; vi is independent of zi,t and Ci for all
i and t.
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Assumption II.4 (baseline hazard). The baseline hazard λ0(t) is nonnegative and
piecewise constant given by (2.12) with at = t for all t.
Heckman and Singer (1984) assume that the distribution of the censoring variable Ci
is known and independent of the covariate zi,t to show the consistency of maximum
likelihood estimators with nonparametric unobserved heterogeneity vi. In our case,
the censoring only occurs at the fixed time T when the panel survey is over, so those
assumptions hold naturally. Evi is usually normalized to one so that the expected
hazard rate becomes the unconditional hazard rate with no unobserved heterogene-
ity: E[λi(t|vi)|zi,t] = λi(t), where λi(t) = exp(γt)φ(x′i,tβ + α
∑
j =iwijdj,t−1). Surely
the finite mean condition of vi restricts its tail behavior and it is necessary for iden-
tification (e.g. Van den Berg, 2001). The number of support of v is assumed to be
finite and fixed, though identification can be obtained even with increasing number of
supports (e.g. Heckman and Singer, 1984; Kiefer and Wolfowitz, 1956; Meyer, 1995).
We assume further conditions for identifying λ0, β, α, and the distribution of v.
Assumption II.5 (covariates). (i) zi,t ∈ Z for an open set Z in Rk+1 and Z =
(z1,1, . . . , zn,T )
′ is of full column rank. (ii) No element of xi,t is constant and at
least one argument of xi,t is defined on the continuum. (iii) The regression function
φ : Z → R is nonlinear and differentiable on Z.
Ignoring the social interaction term, Assumptions II.3, II.4, and II.5 yield identifiably
of our model (2.14) up to a constant multiplication as Elbers and Ridder (1982). In
particular, Assumption II.3 is the same as Assumption 1 of Elbers-Ridder; Assump-






is an increasing function of t ≥ 0; Assumption II.5 and the form of the proportional
hazard function satisfy Assumption 3 of Elbers-Ridder. Adding the social interaction
term
∑
j =iwijdj,t−1 in zi,t does not change the identification result as long as Z is of
full column rank and φ is nonlinear (e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001b). Note that the
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duration model we consider here does not depend on the durations of others directly;
instead the durations are dependent indirectly by including the choice-dependent term
α
∑
j =iwijdj,t−1 in the hazard rate. The identification in this case, therefore, can be
obtained as the standard MPH models by considering α
∑
j =iwijdj,t−1 as another pre-
determined regressor, which becomes much simpler than checking the self-consistent
condition under duration dependence like Brock and Durlauf (2001b, Ch.4.2). One
remark is that there is no endogeneity issue in this case because the random private
utility εi,t in the previous section is assumed to be exogenous and each individual
makes decisions myopically. That is, the current decision is based on the current
values of observable covariates zi,t only and thus no simultaneity issue arises. The
following condition is on the interaction weight wij , where we let W be the n × n
matrix whose (i, j)-th element is wij .
Assumption II.6 (interaction weight matrix). (i) The interaction weight matrix W
is predetermined and correctly specified; (ii) each element of W is nonnegative and
all the diagonal elements are zero; (iii) W is row normalized, i.e.
∑n
j=1wij = 1
for all i; (iv) W is independent of vi for all i, and W is not in the range space of
X = (x1,1, . . . , xn,T )
′.
It is important to assume that the interaction weight matrix W is predetermined
and independent of vi. Pre-specifying W outside the model is an easy way to obtain
a predetermined and exogenous W , which prevents any identification problem as
pointed by Manski (1993)−the reflection problem. The independence assumption
also guarantees the absence of endogeneity problems since all the diagonal elements
of W are zero by construction and Assumption II.3 holds. Keeping the interaction
weight matrix W out of the covariate space prevents any possible multicollinearity
problem between xi,t and
∑
j =iwijdj,t−1 in the index structure. The row normalization
condition is standard in spatial econometrics literature (e.g. Anselin and Bera, 1998),
which prevents the weighted sum
∑
j =iwijdj,t−1 from exploding under the in-filling
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asymptotics (i.e. increasing the number of observations within a fixed boundary.) It
controls the degree of cross sectional dependence so that the standard M-estimator
has proper asymptotic properties (e.g. Kelejian and Prucha, 1999; Lee, 2004).
2.4 Estimation via EM Algorithm
2.4.1 Log-likelihood function
We let ci,t be the binary censoring indicator equal to one if the duration of i is
censored in the t-th interval [t− 1, t). Apparently, ci,t = 1 implies ci,t+1 = 1 for all i
and the censoring variable Ci corresponds to the smallest t that gives ci,t = 1.
We consider the individual i, who drops out of the sample in the Ti-th interval
[Ti − 1, Ti) either by exiting the initial state (ci,Ti = 0) or by censoring (ci,Ti = 1). If
the panel is balanced, Ti = T for all i. If we ignore conditioning on the initial state,
the conditional log-likelihood function on the unobserved v is then given by
















from (2.14) similarly as Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) and Meyer (1990, 1995), where
δi = 1 − ci,Ti, γ = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γT )′ and θ = (β ′, α)′. We also denote Wdt−1 =∑
j =iwijdj,t−1 with dt−1 = (d1,t−1, . . . , dn,t−1)
′ for wii = 0. Integrating (2.15) over the
distribution of v yields the unconditional log-likelihood given by
logL (γ, θ) =
m∑
j=1
pj logL (γ, θ|v = qj) . (2.16)
Note that, however, the ML estimation is not appropriate on the mixture model (2.16)
since the parameters of the heterogeneity distribution are not guaranteed to lie on the
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interior of a compact set (e.g. Heckman and Singer, 1984; Lancaster, 1990, Chapter
8.4; Lee, 2000.) Moreover, many studies report that the ML estimation of mixture
models has convergence problem when the models have both the piecewise constant
baseline hazard and the finite mixture unobserved heterogeneity.
For estimation, we instead use the EM (Expectation-Maximization) algorithm
(e.g. Dempster, Laird, and Rubin, 1977), which was originally invented to deal with
inference in models imposing missing data. In our case, the unobserved heterogeneity
v is essentially a problem of missing data. To fix this idea, we consider an alternative
expression of the conditional log-likelihood function (2.15) for individual i as





i (γ, θ, qj) , (2.17)
where ηij = 1{vi = qj} for all i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , m and
logL∗i (γ, θ, qj) = δi log
(









Note that ηij is unobservable and it can be viewed as missing data satisfying log f (vi) =∑m
j=1 ηij log pj for the prior probabilities pj (j = 1, 2, . . . , m) from (2.13). Hence the
unconditional joint log-likelihood function of both the observed and the unobserved










ηij {log pj + logL∗i (γ, θ, qj)} , (2.19)
where Θ = (γ′, θ′, q1, . . . , qm, p1, . . . , pm−1)
′ is the complete parameter vector, provided
that the known distribution function G(·) is free of additional unknown parameters.
51
Note that pm is automatically determined from the restriction of probabilities, pm =
1−∑m−1j=1 pj .
2.4.2 EM algorithm
The EM algorithm proceeds in two steps. The E-step calculates the conditional
expectation of ηij given observed data δi and Zi = {zi,s = (x′i,s,Wds−1)′ : 0 ≤ s ≤ Ti}
and given the likelihood L∗i evaluated at the current parameter estimates. It can be
shown that the posterior probability of vi = qj is derived as
E (ηij |δi, Zi) = pjL
∗
i (γ, θ, qj)∑m
=1 pL
∗
i (γ, θ, q)
≡ πij for all i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , m.
(2.20)
If we let π̂ij denote πij evaluated at the current parameter estimates, substituting π̂ij













i (γ, θ, qj) . (2.21)
Then, the M-step consists of maximizing Q (Θ) with respect to Θ, which only requires
numerical maximization of logL∗i (γ, θ, qj). Maximization with respect to pj ’s has an
explicit solution as p̂j = n
−1
∑n
i=1 π̂ij from a general result in finite mixture models
(e.g. Everitt and Hand, 1981). We iterate the entire E and M-steps until the estimates
converge.
The initial values for the EM algorithm can be chosen from the ML estimates
of the duration model without unobserved heterogeneity λi (t) = exp(γt)φ(x
′
i,tβ +
αWdt−1). We then start the EM algorithm on the duration model with unobserved
heterogeneity λi (t|ui) = exp(γt + ui)φ(x′i,tβ + αWdt−1), where vi = exp(ui), using
the first step ML estimates (γ01 , . . . , γ
0
T , β
0, α0) and arbitrary (q0, p0) as the initial
values. Note that the reparametrization vi = exp(ui) is convenient in solving the
maximization problem since we do not need to impose restrictions on the sign of
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unobserved heterogeneity (i.e. 0 < vi < ∞ holds for any ui.) For the distribution of
vi, we start with two points of support (q1, q2) and keep adding more points of support
as long as all the estimates q̂j are distinct. Leaving the mean of v unrestricted, we
omit the first term of baseline hazard (i.e. γ1 = 0) so that the parameter to estimate
is Θ = (γ2, . . . , γT , β
′, α, q1, . . . , qm, p1, . . . , pm−1)
′. The Simulated Annealing (e.g.
Goffe, Ferrier, and Rogers, 1994) grid search is helpful to find or confirm the global
maximum.
The EM algorithm is known to be robust to the choice of initial values and prac-
tically guarantees convergence to at least a local maximum. One of its disadvantages
is that it dose not provide standard errors as an immediate by-product unlike the
Newton-Raphson type methods. Louis (1982), Meng and Rubin (1991), Guo and
Rodriguez (1992) and Oakes (1999) propose a way to find a positive-definite observed
information matrix within the EM algorithm framework, from which we can obtain
the asymptotic variance matrix. More precisely, under the regularity conditions,
Louis (1982) shows that the observed information matrix I (Θ) can be obtained as












,where L (Θ) is the complete data
likelihood function in (2.19). The expectation Ev (·) and variance Vv (·) are taken over
the conditional distribution of v given the observed data {δi, Zi}ni=1. As noted in Guo
and Rodriguez (1992), the first term of I (Θ) can be interpreted as the conditional
expectation of the observed information when v is observed, whereas the second term
represents the missing information associated with the conditional distribution of v
given the observed data. The explicit form of the observed information matrix I (Θ)
in our model is given in the Appendix B.
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2.5 The Passage of the Motorcycle Helmet Use Law
2.5.1 Data
Motorcycle-helmet-use (MHU) law The history of each state’s coverage of the
MHU law is obtained from the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (http://www.
iihs.org/laws/helmet history.html.) In our model di,t = 1 means state i chooses the
universal MHU law while di,t = −1 denotes all choices other than the universal law,
which includes not only repealing the law but also passing the partial MHU law. Note
that the partial MHU law applies only to young riders under a certain age (e.g. not
older than 17) and adult riders either inexperienced (e.g. instruction permit holders)
or without sufficient medical insurance. So the proportion of riders covered by the
partial law is rather small. Under such definition, we have 15 states with no revision
and 33 states with revisions. More precisely, we have 27 states with one revision,
4 states with 2 revisions, and other two states with 3 and 4 revisions, respectively,
during the study period. Among these 42 revisions, 34 cases are from −1 to 1 (i.e.
adopt the universal law) whereas 8 cases are from 1 to −1 (i.e. repeal or reduce the
universal law.) Even though we have the dates of law changes, we set the unit of
time as a month because of the availability of covariates, so that the entire sample
period is 383 months (from February 1975 to December 2006; T = 383) for 48 states
excluding Hawaii and Alaska (n = 48.)
Though the study period is long, number of passages is limited and the baseline
hazard γt does not change frequently. To estimate the piecewise constant baseline
hazard (2.12) more efficiently, we group the time periods into four such that they
reflect the history of legislating activities regarding to the MHU law during the sample
period as follows (source: http://www.iihs.org/research/qanda/helmet use.html):
• From Feb. 1975 to Dec. 1978 ( 1 ≤ t ≤ 47): In 1966, the Highway Safety Act was
introduced by the federal government, which required states to have mandatory MHU
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law if they wanted to receive federal funds for highway maintenance and construction.
47 states had complied by 1975; but in 1975, Congress withdrew it and half of the
states had repealed the law within three years.
• From Jan. 1979 to Dec. 1991 ( 48 ≤ t ≤ 203): There were no special activities to
remark.
• From Jan. 1992 to Sep. 1995 ( 204 ≤ t ≤ 248): In the Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991, signed by President Bush in December 1991,
Congress created incentives for states to enact helmet and safety belt use laws. States
with both laws were eligible for special safety grants, but states that had not enacted
them by October 1993 had up to 3 percent of their federal highway allotment redi-
rected to highway safety programs.
• From Oct. 1995 to Dec. 2006 ( 249 ≤ t ≤ 383): Four years after establishing the
incentives, Congress again reversed itself. In the fall of 1995, Congress lifted federal
sanctions against states without MHU laws, paving the way for state legislatures to
repeal the MHU laws.
Figure 2.1 shows the status of choices at four selected time periods, t = 1, 47, 248
and 383. Shaded states have no requirement or maintain the partial MHU law (i.e.
di,t = −1.)
Note that we define two types of spells and failures: “type -1 spell” (“type 1 spell”)
denotes a spell in which individual i stays with di,t = −1 (di,t = 1) throughout. An
individual starts “type -1 spell” if her choice changes from 1 to −1 (i.e. “(1 : -1)-
failure”) and “type 1 spell” if her choice changes from −1 to 1 (i.e. “(-1 : 1)-failure.”)
Each spell ends by either a new choice (i.e. a failure) or censoring then the other type
of spell starts. Figure 2.2-(a) depicts the Kaplan-Meier estimator for survivor function
on both types of failures where the vertical lines separate the time period as described
above. In more details, Figure 2.2-(b) plots the two Kaplan-Meier estimators by the
type of failures separately. We observe that all the failures in the first period are
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(a) Status as of Feb 1975 (t = 1) (b) Status as of Dec 1978 (t = 47)
(c) Status as of Sep 1995 (t = 248) (d) Status as of Dec 2006 (t = 383)
Figure 2.1: History of Motorcycle-Helmet-Use Law
Note: States are shaded when they maintain the partial motorcycle-helmet-use law or
have no requirement.
from “(1 : -1)-failure.” Big drop at the beginning of the third period accounts for a
revision from a partial to universal coverage in California. (The records shows that
only two states expanded the coverage during the third period: California expanded
the law to universal coverage in January 1992 and Rhode Island expanded coverage
to operators 20 years-old and younger in July 1992. In our definition of revision,
however, only California’s revision counts.) Finally most revisions in the last period
are in “(1 : -1)-failure.” It suggests that when the Federal government lifted the
incentive to adopt the universal MHU law, states reacted quickly to repeal or reduce
the law as shown in the first and the last period. States, however, have the incentive
to adopt the universal law voluntarily as shown in the second period group where no
incentive or requirement was given by the Federal government.
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(a) For both failure types (b) Grouped by failure types
Figure 2.2: Kaplan-Meier Estimator for Survival Functions
Social interactions To analyze the social interaction between neighboring states,
we consider 48 states excluding Hawaii and Alaska, where the neighborhood is defined
based on the geographical locations. More precisely, if two states are adjacent or share
borders, then they are defined as neighbors: wij = wji = 1 if i and j are neighbors to
each other, wij = 0 otherwise. We naturally assume that the neighborhood is time
invariant in this case. We redefine wij by dividing it by the total number of borders
shared (i.e. total number of neighbors) of state i, to make it as a well-defined weight
as well as row-normalized (i.e.
∑n
j=1wij = 1.)
Considering geographical locations as a measure of the social-dependence measure
is intuitive in this particular example, even after controlling for any geographical,
meteorological and cultural similarities among the states. Motocyclists frequently
traveling between state boarders would like to have a homogenous regulation between
them. Insurance companies may present the data comparing fatality rates across state
border to emphasize that introducing the universal MHU law reduces the probability
of mortality. If we regard a state’s decision on the coverage law as a conclusion of the
residents’ consensus, therefore, the geographical proximity would be a strong factor
to measure the social distance in this decision making procedure.
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Table 2.1: Definitions of Variables and Summary Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std.Dev Min Max
LRoadway Total public road and street mileage -2.750 0.795 -5.271 -1.184
in million miles in log scale
Elevdiff Difference between highest and lowest 0.525 0.042 0.003 0.148
elevation in ft divided by 100,000
LPrecip Mean number of days in a month -0.133 0.367 -1.984 0.514
with precipitation .01 inches or higher
divided by 10 then logarithms taken
Population Total population divided by a million 4.967 5.209 0.334 34.55
Registered Number of registered motorcycles 1.011 1.074 0.012 7.457
divided by 100,000
FatalRate Number of fatalities in the previous 0.232 0.430 0 2.995
month divided by Population
NbhdAvg Average decisions of neighbors 0.333 0.662 -1 1
in the previous month
Control variables National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) main-
tains the Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS,) which contains monthly fatality
data from 1975 by the vehicle types. In this study, we count fatalities occurred by
motorcycles only excluding mopeds, mini-bikes and motor scooters, and use the fa-
tality rates per population. Since agents can only observe the fatality rate up to
previous month at each time, we include the fatality rate lagged by one month. The
number of registered motorcycles is provided by the Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA.) National Climate Data Center (NCDC) by National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration (NOAA) provides the mean number of days in a month with
precipitation 0.01 inch or higher, which could control for seasonality.
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 summarize the variables used in the estimation and their de-
scriptive statistics. LRoadway, ElevDiff and LPrecip represent the possibility of ac-
cident occurrences; ElevDiff and LPrecip represent the driving condition in each
state. States have more incentive to adopt the universal MHU law for higher val-
ues of LRoadway, ElevDiff or LPrecip, and we expect the coefficients for these three

















































































































































































conflicting opinions. Although they are naturally highly correlated, their effects on
the choices of states are in the opposite direction. That is, as population grows, more
car drivers are expected and so is higher pressure to introduce or maintain the uni-
versal MHU law. On the other hand, as the number of registered motorcycles rises,
motorcyclists’ opinion becomes more substantive. With regard to the state’s decisions
on the MHU law, the coefficient of Population is thus expected to be positive while
that of Registered be negative.
The covariates FatalRate and NbhdAvg are of the particular interest. The fatality
rate is expected to have a high positive impact on the hazard rate for “(-1 : 1)-
failure.” That is, if a state’s safety concern is sufficiently substantial, it tends to have
the universal MHU law when the previous fatality rate is high. Also, the effect of
NbhdAvg is anticipated to be highly positive when the social interactions matters in
this decision making. Note that the positive coefficient of NbhdAvg means that as
more neighboring states adopt the universal MHU law, the higher hazard rate for “(-1
: 1)-failure” (i.e. revision of choice from −1 to 1) the state would encounter if it does
not currently enforce the universal MHU law. At the same time, if the universal law
is currently effective in the state, the hazard rate for “(1 : -1)-failure” (i.e. revision
of choice from 1 to −1) decreases with the positive coefficient of NbhdAvg. In other
words, the probability rate that the state would repeal or reduce the universal law
becomes lower as more neighbors adopt the universal law.
2.5.2 Estimation results
For estimation, we assume the logistic specification for G(·) in (2.7). More pre-
cisely, conditional on zi,t, we assume that (εi(t,−1) − εi(t, 1))/σ follows the inde-
pendent type I extreme value distribution with variance σ2 > 0 so that G(z) =
exp(z/σ)/[1 + exp(z/σ)] for all −∞ < z < ∞. For the identification purpose, we
assume the unit scale parameter (σ = 1.) In addition, since the decisions can be in
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both directions (i.e. 1 to −1 by repealing the law and −1 to 1 by adopting the law,)
we specify the duration model as λi (t|vi) = exp(γt)φdi,t−1(x′i,tβ + α
∑
j =iwijdj,t−1)vi,
where φdi,t−1 (z) = G(2z) if di,t−1 = −1 and 1−G(2z) if di,t−1 = 1. Then the analysis
becomes similar to a multi-spell duration analysis by letting the spell ends if any
revision of the law is effective. In this case, the log-likelihood function is given by







































where the k-th spell of individual i is from T i(k) to T i(k) and δi(k) is the censoring
indicator of the spell k. In this context, we could understand the model as an alter-
nating state model, where each spell does not rely on the history of events occurred
before. Therefore, the interpretation of the sign of (α, β ′)′ should be such that the
positive values accelerate “(-1 : 1)-failure” that corresponds to the higher probability
rate of switching from −1 to 1. Negative values, on the other hand, accelerate “type 1
failure” and decelerates the “type -1 failure” at the same time. It thereby represents
the lower probability rate of switching from −1 to 1.
Table 2.3 summarizes the estimation results. The first two columns show the ML
estimates obtained without unobserved heterogeneity. When NbhdAvg is omitted,
all estimates except for Elevdiff are highly significant but the signs for LRoadway
and FatalRate are in the opposite direction to what were expected. Signs of all the
estimates except for LPrecip and FatalRate are as expected when the social interaction
NbhdAvg is taken into account. Note that, however, the estimates for LPrecip and
(especially) FatalRate are not significant at the 5% level, while the effects from social
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interactions is highly significant.
The last column of the table displays the estimates of the MPH model assuming
two levels of heterogeneity (q1, q2) using the EM algorithm with the simulated an-
nealing to find the global maximum. The values on the second column are used for
the initial values. We set γ1 = 0, whereas the values of q1 and q2, and accordingly the
mean of v, are left unrestricted. Signs of all the estimates are as expected except for
LPrecip though it is not significantly different from zero at the 5% level. For other
covariates, LRoadway is the only significant variable that affects the decision of the
MHU law. It suggests that the driving condition is not an important factor when the
policy makers decide the level of the MHU law. However, as the total length of road
grows, the state tends to have a stricter MHU law. Both parameters for covariates
Population and Registered, which represent the pressure of two conflicting opinions,
are significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level and are signed as
expected.
Note that the sign of the estimates for FatalRate is as expected in the full model
although it is not significant at the 5% level. However, the statistical insignificance
does not mean that the MHU law is ineffective on the fatality rate. The estimation
result in Table 2.3 only suggests that the previous fatality rate is not relevant when
a state considers revision of the current MHU law. On the other hand, the estimates
for NbhdAvg is significantly positive at the 5% level, which suggests that the policy
makers in each state tend to make a parallel decision with neighboring states. In other
words, though this analysis does not give an answer to a long-debated issue whether to
introduce the mandatory motorcycle-helmet-use law, it explains a behavioral aspect
of the legislative decision making procedure (i.e. social interactions) and empirically
shows how the proximity between agents affects the decision making.
To show the magnitude of effect on hazard rate by each covariate, Table 2.4 re-
ports the averaged elasticities of hazard rates for each covariates. For log-transformed
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Table 2.3: Estimation Results
No Unobs. No Unobs. With Unobs.
Hetero. I Hetero. II Hetero.
LRoadway -0.650∗∗ 0.354∗∗ 0.346∗∗
(0.059) (0.073) (0.057)
Elevdiff 3.549 3.243 1.759
(2.170) (2.134) (2.099)
LPrecip 1.043∗∗ -0.023 -0.599∗
(0.264) (0.248) (0.329)
Population 0.400∗∗ 0.255∗∗ 0.127∗∗
(0.015) (0.067) (0.022)
Registered -1.579∗∗ -1.519∗∗ -0.705∗∗
(0.070) (0.237) (0.103)






















Log-Likelihood -767.588 -579.465 -238.370
Note: ML estimation is used for the case without unobserved heterogeneity, whereas
EMmethod is used for the case with unobserved heterogeneity. Numbers in parentheses
denote standard errors. ∗ and ∗∗ represent significance at 10% and 5%, respectively.
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covariates (LRoadway and LPrecip,) the values are obtained with respect to the per-
centage change of the original levels. For NbhdAvg, the values are obtained by the
change in one of the neighbors’ choices from −1 to 1 (e.g. Halvorsen and Palmquist,
1980). Note that elasticities do not depend on the baseline hazard by virtue of the
proportional hazard specification. A 10% increase in total length of public roadway
(Roadway) leads to 4.01% increase and 2.91% decrease in the hazard rate for “(-1 :
1)-failure” (i.e. likelihood to introduce the law) and “type 1 failure” (likelihood to
repeal or reduce the law,) respectively. Same movements are found for Precip, Pop-
ulation. and FatalRate. The percentage change in the elevation difference (Elevdiff )
would not induce much of percentage changes in hazard rates. On the other hand,
10% increase in the number of registered motorcycles (Registered) results in 9.12%
decrease in hazard rate for “(-1 : 1)-failure” whereas 5.13% increase in that for “(1
: -1)-failure.” Finally, when a neighbor changes its choice from −1 to 1, 169.9%
increase and 37.9% decrease in hazard rate for “type -1 failure” and “(1 : -1)-failure”
are obtained, respectively. It shows that, as the elasticity by a neighbor’s choice
turns out substantially high, each state indeed reacts to the neighbors’ decisions very
sensitively. However, the degree of sensitivity is not symmetric: pressure from social
interactions with neighboring states is higher, on the average, toward the direction
to adopting the universal law than the other way around.
Finally, the estimation result of the baseline hazard in the full model with unob-
served heterogeneity (the last column of Table 2.3) shows that the piecewise baseline
hazard estimate (exp(γ̂1), . . . , exp(γ̂4)) = (1.000, 0.208, 0.058, 0.144) are all highly sig-
nificant. It well demonstrates the overall behavior of the states, which corresponds to
the common trend of the historic changes of the federal regulations as summarized in
the previous subsection. Note that the baseline hazard during the third period turns
out to be substantially low, which shows that the incentives for states to enact the
MHU law turned out to be not so effective.
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Table 2.4: Elasticities of Hazard Rates












j =i wijdj,t−1)vi for d = −1, 1, the table
represents averaged estimates of the elasticities ∂ log λ̂i[d]/∂ log xi,t over the observa-
tions. Elasticities for Roadway and Precip are calculated with respect to the change
of Roadway and Precip before taking logs. Elasticities for NbhdAvg is obtained as
(e.g., for the case of “(-1: 1)-failure”) (λ̂ci [−1] − λ̂i[−1])/λ̂i[−1], where λ̂ci [−1] is the
counterfactual hazard rate when one of the neighbors changes from -1 to 1, whereas
λ̂i[−1] is the original hazard rate estimate.
For the levels of heterogeneity, the higher level (q̂1,) which corresponds to the states
that have higher tendency to change the law, is much larger than the lower level (q̂2)
and the overall probability assigned to the former is about 2.2 times higher than
that associated with the latter. As the estimates converge, the posterior probabilities
(π̂i1, π̂i2) for each state i converges to the extreme values either 0 or 1. Figure 2.3 shows
that the posterior probabilities correctly describe each state’s behavior of changing
the MHU law in that all states who have revised their law at least once are assigned
(a) Number of law changes (b) Probability assigned to higher level
of heterogeneity (q̂1)
Figure 2.3: Law Changes and Heterogeneity
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to higher level of unobserved heterogeneity and vice versa. Note that in contrast to
the standard duration data, in which a high-risk group is likely to have early events,
a high-risk group in the longitudinal case appears to have frequent events, which can
be described the faster rate of the Poisson process with higher level of vi.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
The mandatory MHU law is a long-debated issue. One concerning safety supports
the universal MHU law (e.g. Houston and Richardson, 2007; Muller, 2004; Weiss,
1992), which is mainly backed by automobile drivers (i.e. non-motorcyclists) and
insurance companies. The opposite opinion adheres to the idea that wearing helmet
is a personal choice: Motorcyclists and liberalists insist that society’s role is not to
mandate personal safety but rather to provide the education and experience neces-
sary to aid people in making these decisions for themselves. Moreover, even though
it is a common wisdom that wearing helmet reduces the mortality in motorcycle ac-
cidents, medical evidences are still controversial (e.g. Cooter, McLean, David, and
Simpson, 1988; Goldstein, 1986; Huston and Sears, 1981; Krantz, 1985; Stolzenberg
and D’Alessio, 2003).
Though we aware such a long debate on the mandatory MHU law, we do not
attempt to answer to this question in this chapter. The main point of this chapter is
to find the evidence that the coverage of the MHU law in a state is spatially dependent
on neighboring states’ coverage. We develop a model analyzing states’ decision on the
coverage of the MHU law. Reflecting the fact that each decision making can be only
realized at certain times, a hazard model naturally follows. In particular, we introduce
a grouped mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model with social interactions, which
serves as the econometric foundation of the states’ choice model. Note that, however,
this hazard model is different from the cross-sectional duration dependent models
(e.g. Sirakaya, 2006) since the social interaction is based on others’ discrete choice
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variables instead of the durations.
Based on the fact that not many revisions were made, we assume that the decisions
are myopic. As a natural extension, a fully dynamic model incorporating a forward-
looking behavior of agents is to be developed.
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CHAPTER III
Estimation of Latent Dependent Variables in
Dynamic Panel Data Models with Lagged Ranking
as a Regressor: The Best States for Business
3.1 Introduction
Economic variables are sometimes reported by their ranking only, without reveal-
ing their values. Examples include rankings on companies’ market shares, average
prices, and sales, to name a few. It occurs more frequently on variables for market-
ing research including brand power ranking, top innovative companies, and so on.
The approach presented in this chapter provides a methodology for latent variables
with panel data in the presence of both lagged ranking and unobservable individual
heterogeneity.
In cross-sectional settings, models with ranked data have used a probit or logit
framework with constant or random utility specifications. They may extend to appli-
cations for panel data. Typically, they both need ranking observations on alternatives
chosen by respondents. More precisely, each respondent (or consumer) is provided a
set of alternatives (e.g. goods and brands) and she answers the order of her prefer-
ence which forms a ranking observation for this particular respondent. With a limited
number of alternatives and many respondents, a researcher can conduct an analysis
68
in a framework with a limited dependent variable.
In this study, however, we analyze a panel data in which the rankings of alterna-
tives are only observed over time and no respondent-level choices are available. In
addition, the current latent dependent variable is affected by the revealed ranking in
the previous period due to the “reputation” effect. For instance, the weekly ranking
of NCAA college football teams is based on last week’s ranking and the current week’s
game results or performances. The ranking is determined by polls but actual votes
are not revealed. If one is interested in a team’s (latent) “ability,” she has to make
an inference based on past rankings and performances, which are only observable.
Provided only information on output ranking rather than micro-level data, the
difficulty arises with respect to estimation. Mainly, the number of data is not sufficient
to estimate with precision by conventional probit or logit. In each time period, only
one full ranking order is observed. This study gets around this problem by utilizing
the exploding property of the logit model where each observation is exploded into
several pseudo-observations for the purposes of estimation.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the an-
nual ranking for business environment announced by Forbes magazine and addresses
issues in econometrical modeling. Section 3.3 presents the econometric model for
dynamic panel data with latent dependent variable in the presence of unobserved in-
dividual effects where lagged ranking among individuals enters as a regressor. Section
3.4 discusses how to estimate the model with simulation. Section 3.5 makes remarks
on ties in the ranking. Section 3.6 discusses the estimation results, and section 3.7 is
devoted to conclusions.
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3.2 Ranking for Business Environment
3.2.1 Background
Since 2006, Forbes magazine has announced the annual ranking of the “best
states for business.” They declare that their ranking measures six vital categories
for businesses: costs, labor supply, regulatory environment, current economic climate,
growth prospects and quality of life (http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/23/best-states-
for-business-beltway-best-states.html.) Also, according to them, business costs, which
include labor, energy, and taxes are weighted the most heavily. We consider “business
environment” as a latent output which takes an evolution mechanism relying on cur-
rent economic climate and last year’s ranking. The dependence on last year’s ranking
is twofold. On one hand, some factors cannot be easily changed over time including
reserves of natural resources, arable land area, and quality of life. So previous ranking
may be kept in the next period with regard to these factors. On the other hand, as
Forbes remarked, the growth prospects are one of the main factors. Since current
ranking reflects the prospected growth for next several years, it may well carry over
the next period. For example, Forbes denoted top-ranked states in 2009 share an
expanding, educated workforce. It said
“[t]he three states that followed [1st-ranked] Virginia in the rankings (Wash-
ington, Utah, and Colorado) also ranked in the top four along with Vir-
ginia in labor supply category, which looks at high school and college at-
tainment, as well as net migration and projected population growth.”
(http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/23/best-states-for-business-beltway-best-states.html)
So the projected expansion in population (or workforce) raises a state’s ranking in
current year and makes its business environment look better in next year as well.
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3.2.2 Issues in econometric modeling
In this subsection, we address some issues in econometric modeling with the annual
ranking of the best states for business.
First, we have a latent variable, namely business environment. What we observe
is the ordinal ranking of business environment in each state along with observable
business environment shifters, e.g. unemployment rate and population. In other
words, business environment itself is a latent variable while we observe its relative
positions so that a researcher can tell a state’s business environment is better or worse
than all the others for all states.
Second, provided only information on output ranking rather than micro-level data,
the difficulty arises with respect to estimation. Mainly, the number of data is not suf-
ficient to estimate with precision by conventional probit or logit. In each time period,
only one full ranking order is observed. To utilize information as much as possible, we
use the exploding property of the logit model where each observation is exploded into
several pseudo-observations for the purposes of estimation. For example, suppose we
observe a ranking ordered as (A > B > C > D). Then we can extract the following
three pieces of information (or pseudo-observations) from this single observation of
ranking order: (A > {B,C,D}), (B > {C,D}), and (C > D).
Third, as briefly introduced in the previous section, the reputation effect plays an
important role in establishing business environment. We take this effect into account
by using a lagged ranking as a regressor.
Fourth, each state has its own unobservable (to the researcher) individual hetero-
geneity. For example, residents’ attitude to a certain company or industry in a state
would not be observable.
Fifth, though it is not occurred in the ranking of the best states for business, ties
in ranking make the estimation even more difficult. We make a remark on this issue




Suppose we have a latent (“output”) variable y∗it that has a data generating process
(DGP) as follows:
y∗i0 = ci + εi0, (3.1)
y∗it = ci + αg(ri,t−1) + xitβ + εit, (3.2)
εt|c, rt−1, . . . , r0, x ∼ F (0,Ω), (3.3)
rit = 1 +
n∑
j=1
I{y∗it < y∗jt}, (3.4)
where we index individual and time as i = 1, . . . , n and t = 1, . . . , T , respectively.
Here ci denotes the unobservable (to the researcher) individual heterogeneity, xit is
strictly exogenous regressors with length Kx, and εit is an unobserved error term. The
vector of regressors throughout entire time periods is denoted as xi := (xi1, . . . , xiT ).
The definition (3.4) represents the rank of y∗it at time t, which is observable instead
of the latent variable y∗it. The indicator function I{·} has value one if the expression
in the parenthesis is true and zero otherwise. Notice that the “best” rank is 1 and
n is the “worst.” Hence 1 = r1t = r2t − 1 = r3t − 2 = . . . = rnt − (n − 1) if and




3t > . . . > y
∗
nt. If rit < rjt (rij > rjt, resp.), we say individual i
is ranked higher (lower, resp.) than individual j or individual i is positioned above
(below, resp.) individual j at time t.
In equation (3.2), the function g(·) accommodates the effect of the individual’s
realized ranking in the previous period, ri,t−1, on her current (latent) output, y
∗
it. This
set up accounts for the “reputation” effect on the output variable. That is, individual
i who performed well among competitors in the previous period is considered to have
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high valued output in the current period.1 Notice that g(ri,t−1) is exogenous to y
∗
it
since it is lagged.
To distinguish a case with no tie in ranking to others, we introduce a notion of
complete ranking where no tie of ranking occurs. Formal definitions of complete and
incomplete rankings follows.
Definition III.1. DenoteNR andNI be the set of rankings and the set of individuals,
respectively. A ranking is said to be complete if there exists a one-to-one function
πt : NR → NI for all t = 0, . . . , T . Otherwise, it is incomplete.
Hence for any rankings, rank k goes to individual πt(k) at each time t. Only for
a complete ranking there is a unique individual πt(k) at each time t. For now, we
assume that the output ranking is complete and we will relax this assumption and
discuss it in section 3.5.
Denote the systematic component of the DGP (3.2) as follows:
μit := ci + αg(ri,t−1) + xitβ (3.5)
so that the output of individual i at time t is represented as y∗it = μit + εit. Consider
a ranking event, {πt(i) = i : i ∈ NI} so that y∗1t > y∗2t > y∗3t > . . . > y∗nt out





3t > . . . > y
∗
nt as
P({πt(i) = i : i ∈ NI}) = P(y∗1t > y∗2t, y∗2t > y∗3t, . . . , y∗n−1,t > y∗nt)
= P(y∗2t − y∗1t < 0, y∗3t − y∗2t < 0, . . . , y∗nt − y∗n−1,t < 0). (3.6)
1Many ranking/rating schemes in sports take the previous ranking into account when they access
the current ranking of teams or players. Examples include World Football Elo Ratings, a ranking
system for men’s national teams in association football. The factors taken into consideration when
calculating a team’s new rating are (i) the team’s old rating, (ii) the considered weight of the
tournament, (iii) the result of the match including the goal difference of it, and (iv) the expected
result of the match.
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Define a (n− 1)× n transformation matrix
Mt =
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−1 1 0 . . . 0
0 −1 1 . . . ...
... 0 −1 . . . 0
...
. . .
. . . 1
0 0 . . . 0 −1
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
where the elementsMt(k, k) =Mt(n, n) = −1 andMt(k, k+1) = 1 for k = 1, . . . , n−1,
and all other entries are zero. Stack the individuals from 1 to n, so that the DGP
(3.2) is represented for each time t in vector form as y∗t = μt+ εt, where εt ∼ F (0,Ω).
Then we have
P({πt(i) = i : i ∈ NI}) = P(Mty∗t < 0)
= P(Mtμt +Mtεt < 0)
= P(Mtεt < −Mtμt).
In general, one can construct a transition matrixMt such thatMt(k, πt(k)) =Mt(n, πt(n)) =
−1, Mt(k, πt(k + 1)) = 1 for k = 1, . . . , n − 1, and all the other elements are zero.
Then the vector of error differences Mtεt is distributed jointly a certain distribution
with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix MtΩM
′
t .
The problem occurs when one tries to estimate the model (3.1)-(3.4) with a typical
panel data set where n is large and T is small. The full ranking orders are observed
only T times while the number of possible ranking events are enormous: n! orderings
at each time. As n gets large, it becomes in general almost impossible to estimate
the parameters with precision. This study gets around this problem by utilizing the
exploding property of logit model where each observation is exploded into several
pseudo-observations for the purposes of estimation.
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3.3.2 Mixed exploded logit
Let us assume that εit are iid with a type I extreme value distribution, given
by P (εit ≤ x) = exp(− exp(x)). The odds that individual i is ranked higher than
j (y∗it > y
∗
jt ⇐⇒ rit < rjt) is given by exp(μit − μjt). For notational ease, denote
git := g(rit). We again take a ranking event rt = {πt(i) = i : i ∈ NI} (y∗1t > y∗2t >
y∗3t > . . . > y
∗
nt) into consideration. Provided a ranking event, consider a subranking
event by excluding the highest value: y∗2t > y
∗
3t > . . . > y
∗
nt in this case. Then we















1t|NI) · P(y∗2t > y∗3t > . . . > y∗nt), (3.7)
where P(y∗it|S) represents the probability that the output of individual i is ranked
first among those of elements in a set S at time t. Luce and Suppes (1965) provides
this decomposition theorem for constant utility model. See Chapman and Staelin
(1982) for application within the random utility model. As remarked in Chapman




3t > . . . > y
∗
nt),
is decomposed into the product of the probability of a top-ranking event, P(y∗1t|NI),
and the probability of a subranking event, P(y∗2t > y
∗
3t > . . . > y
∗
nt). By succes-
sively applying the decomposition (3.7) to the subranking events, we can rewrite the





3t > . . . > y
∗
nt)
= P(y∗1t|NI) · P(y∗2t|NI\{1}) . . .P(y∗n−1,t|NI\{1, . . . , n− 2}). (3.8)
Then the probability of a top-ranking event that individual 1 is ranked first from
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NI given regressor values is that
















See Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992, pp.39∼40) for proof of last equality.
Similarly, given that y∗1t is the greatest among all outputs, the probability that y
∗
2t is
the greatest among outputs of remaining individuals (y∗2t > y
∗
jt, for all j ∈ NI\{1})
is then




I{y∗2t < y∗jt} = 1




I{y∗2t < y∗jt} = 0





jt, ∀j = 1, 2





So proceeding from probability (3.9) to (3.10), we observe that the numerator remains
as the exponential of current rank’s systematic component while the denominator is
decreased by the numerator of individual who ranked immediately above. Finally, for
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the last two outputs, we obtain
















Therefore substituting the probabilities of n−1 top-ranking events into (3.8), one
can generally obtain the density of a ranking event rt = (r1t, . . . , rnt) given (c, gt−1, xt)
is








where δijt = 1 if rit ≤ rjt or i = j is ranked lowest with no tie, and 0 otherwise.
Equation (3.12) implies that a ranking event of n outputs can be represented as
being the same as n− 1 independent orderings between two individual outputs, also
known as pseudo-observations. So a ranking event at each time period constitutes an
observation and is written as if it were multiple pseudo-observations. For this explo-
sion into multiple pseudo-observations for the purposes of estimation, a logit model on
ranked observations is called an exploded logit. Salient applications of exploded logit
models include Beggs, Cardell, and Hausman (1981), Chapman and Staelin (1982),
and Hausman and Ruud (1987) to name a few.
Under the assumptions that the dynamics of the conditional distributions are
correctly specified and xi = (xi1, . . . , xiT ) is strictly exogenous conditional on ci, the
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joint density of (r1, . . . , rT ) given (r0, x, c) is given by
f(r1, . . . , rT |r0, x, c) =
T∏
t=1
ft(rt|c, gt−1, xt; θ) (3.13)
To construct the likelihood function, it is necessary to integrate the joint density
(3.13) over the distribution of the unobserved individual heterogeneity ci. We specify
the density of c given (ri0, xi) with parameter vector η as h(c|ri0, xi; η). Notice that

































Given that h(c|ri0, xi; η) is correctly specified, the log-likelihood function is given by




















h(c|ri0, xi; η)dc (3.15)
where θ denotes all the parameters except those for c. Since the integral in the
likelihood function (3.15) does not have a closed form solution, we resort on simulation
for estimation. We will revisit issues in estimation in section 3.4.
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3.4 Estimation with Simulation
Throughout the rest of this study, we assume that the individual heterogeneity ci
is specified as
ci = η0 + η1ri0 + ziη2 + νi (3.16)
where zi is an individual-specific regressors with length Kz, η = (η0, η1, η2) is a length
(Kz + 2) parameter vector, and νi|ri0, zi ∼ iid N (0, σ2ν). Denote Φ(·) and φ(·) be the
cdf and pdf of the standard normal distribution, respectively. Given the equivalency
in their role, we denote wit := (gi,t−1, xit)
′ and γ := (α, β) for further notational ease.
Assume that εi0 is iid with standard logistic distribution, and no tie was observed
in the data set. Then the log-likelihood (3.15) is rewritten as
l(θ, η|r0, . . . , rT , x1, . . . , xn)



































where θ := (γ, σ2ν). As denoted at the end of section 3.3.1, it is necessary to simulate
the each value of integral for each individual in the likelihood (3.17). It is approxi-
mated through simple simulation steps for any given value of (θ, η, σ2ν): At each period
of simulation s, (i) draw a value of ν0 from a standard normal distribution and label
it νs0 , (ii) multiply ν0 by σν to obtain ν
s = σνν
s
0, and (iii) calculate the probability in
the square brackets with this adjusted draw νs. Then (iv) repeat steps i through iii
S times. The average becomes the value of integral except 1/σν which can be pulled
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The simulated log-likelihood function is given by
lsim(θ, η|r0, . . . , rT , x1, . . . , xn)






































In this section, we investigate the case when several individuals are observed as
being tied. When rit = rjt for some individuals i and j (i = j) at time t, it is
equivalent to y∗it = y
∗
jt. However, with continuous distribution F it is an event of
probability zero. So we consider a threshold B, to be estimated, defined as follows:
rit = rjt ⇐⇒ |y∗it − y∗jt| ≤ b (3.20)
for all i, j, t, and i = j. In other words, the observed ranking order is distinguished
only when two latent outputs are sufficiently different. Therefore, a tie further reduces
information on the latent output. Following the notation in section 3.3.1, we represent
an allocation of ranking by a mapping π̃t : NR → NI . Hence rank k goes to individual
π̃t(k), possibly multiple values, at each time t.
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Consider the standard competition ranking, also known as “1224” ranking. That
is, individuals that have output value less than b apart receive the same ranking
number, and then a gap is left in the ranking numbers. The number of ranking
numbers that are left out in this gap is one less than the number of individuals
that have equal value of output. If two (or more) individuals tie for a position
in the ranking, the position of all those ranked below them is unaffected. In our
notation, if #π̃t(k) = m > 1, ranks k + 1, . . . , k + m − 1 are left out and thus
π̃t(k + 1) = . . . = π̃t(k +m− 1) = ∅. In this scheme, ranking is newly defined as
r̃it = 1 +
n∑
j=1
I{y∗it < y∗jt − b}. (3.21)
Notice that r̃it = rit when b = 0.
For propositional purpose, assume that π̃t(i) = {i, i + 1} and π̃t(k) = k for k =
1, . . . , i − 1, i + 2, . . . , n. That is, individuals are sorted by their output values in
descending order, and individuals i and i + 1 are tied. In this ordering, observing
r̃it = r̃i+1,t = i is the outcome of two possibilities: (A) outcome of individual i is
greater than that of i+1 and the difference is less than b (0 < y∗it− y∗i+1,t < b) or (B)
outcome of individual i is smaller than that of i+ 1 and the difference is less than b
(0 < y∗i+1,t − y∗it < b). Both events A and B are given that y∗1t, . . . , y∗i−1,t are greater
than y∗it + b and y
∗
i+1,t + b, and y
∗
i+2,t, . . . , y
∗
nt are smaller than y
∗
it − b and y∗i+1,t − b.
Since events A and B are mutually exclusive, we have
P(π̃t(i) = {i, i+ 1}|NI\{1, . . . , i− 1}) = P(y∗it, y∗i+1,t|NI\{1, . . . , i− 1})
= P(A or B)
= P(A) + P(B). (3.22)
By definition, the probability P(A) is further decomposed into two probabilities: (A1)
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probability that y∗it − y∗i+1,t > 0 and (A2) probability that y∗it − y∗i+1,t < b given that
the ordering of other individuals’ outcomes are set as above and they are sufficiently
apart from y∗it and y
∗
i+1,t.
P(A) = P(A1) · P(A2)




i+2,t + b > . . . > y
∗
nt + b)




exp(μit) + exp(μi+1,t) +
∑n







k=i+1 exp(μkt + b)
)
. (3.23)
We can derive P(B) in a similar manner. So the ith term in the tth component of






























In general, one can derive for an observed π̃t(k)


























So the contribution of an output observed tied with some outputs is its probability of
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being ranked highest among outputs where higher ranked outputs are censored out
multiplied by each probability of being close to an output tied with it. Notice that
those ranked lower than an output enter with the threshold b considered. Hence the



























When no tie is allowed, i.e. b = 0 and #π̃t(k) = 1 for all k = 1, . . . , n, this expression
reduces to equation (3.12) derived in the previous section. On the other hand, when
all the outputs are tied, i.e. b→ ∞ and π̃t(1) = NI , it collapses to 1 and provides no
information on parameters.
The likelihood function for estimation would be the product across time periods
of the likelihood for a single time period in equation (3.25). However it is very
computationally intensive to estimate. Instead, one might think of an approximation
for the likelihood. Similar attempts to approximate the likelihood function with tied
rankings unfortunately have been shown to be inaccurate when the number of tied
outputs is substantial fraction of outputs at that rank or higher. (See Farewell and
Prentice (1980) and Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002) for details.) Moreover, when we
think of a mixed model where μit’s are stochastic, the inaccuracy even becomes worse.
3.6 Estimation Results and Discussion
3.6.1 Data
We use the 5 different annual rankings announced 2006 through 2010. Regressors
are selected to represent each state’s current environment and growth prospect. For
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individual heterogeneity, two covariates are introduced: The average bond rating for
state governments (BondRating) and number of cities with population of 100,00 or
more in a state (NBigCity.) The covariate BondRating is obtained by taking average
of three major indices by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch over three years
(2005-2007.) It represents both current economic environment and expectations for
future climate of a state. Average is taken since three indices are almost identical
for a state and they do not change significantly over time. Based on the well-known
equivalency across indices (e.g. AA+ of S&P is equivalent to Moody’s and Fitch
Aa1) they are quantified from 1 to 9. As shown in Table 3.1, all of the states’
ratings are higher than equal to 7, the lowest rating for investment grades. The
covariate NBigCity is obtained from U.S. Census Bureau and it represents the degree
of urbanization. One can expect the business environment is nicer in (or near) a large
city than rural areas owing to its high demand and labor supply.
The regressors xit include population, household median income, energy price,
gross state product (GSP), unemployment rate, and tax environment. First two co-
variates explains the demand side of each state. As noted above, the business climate
gets more favorable in general as population increases. However, a diminishing pat-
tern would be revealed when population reaches a certain amount. To accommodate
the diminishing marginal effect of population to business climate, population is in-
cluded in log scale (LPopulation.) Household median income (MedInc) denotes the
purchasing power of consumers. In the cost side, each state’s total energy average
price (EnPrice) level is used. This price index includes the cost for electricity, gas,
and so on. To explain each state’s general economic environment, three covariates are
finally included: GSP, unemployment rate, and tax environment. Each state’s real
GSP (RGSP) and unemployment rate (UnempRate) are indicators representing its
economic performance. Note that the per capita GSP is not used to avoid the mul-
ticollinearity problem since it may well be highly correlated with household median
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income.
A corporate tax index provided by Tax Foundation (CorpTaxEnv) is a score show-
ing how favorable a state’s corporate tax system is for business. The higher the score,
the more favorable the system is for business. Using the corporate tax rate directly
would not be preferable in two reasons: First, several states hold multiple brackets
and arbitrary choice from those rates (e.g. averaging over rates or taking the maxi-
mum rate) would not precisely pick a representative value. Second, what essentially
we want to include here is the incentive/disincentive that a state government offers
with regard to corporate tax, a representative measure of state’s regulation. When
merely the tax rate is used, any sort of incentives are excluded. Even though some
incentives are represented by tax rate, they are typically in a special form of rates
(e.g. exemption when a certain condition holds.) Then one still needs to create a
proxy index for tax rates.
Table 3.1 displays the definitions of covariates and their summary statistics. The
data sources are denoted at the rightmost column.
3.6.2 Estimation results
The function for lagged ranking is chosen to be g(x) = −√x thereby the coefficient
for ranking is expected to be positive and the gap between y∗i and y
∗
j are getting bigger
as two states i and j are ranked higher. The number of simulation is set to be S = 500.
Table 3.2 reports the estimation results.
As expected, the estimated parameter for the previous ranking, α̂, is obtained to
be positive and is highly significant. Among covariates, state’s energy average price
(EnPrice) and unemployment rate (UnempRate) are significant with expected direc-
tion. That is, when a state faces high cost of production, its business environment
becomes harsh. Similarly, a state’s business climate gets worse as unemployment

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.2: Estimation Results
Variable Parameter Estimate Std.Err.
Constant η0 -23.713 21.270
Initial Ranking η1 32.741
∗ 2.440
BondRating η21 -46.192 23.683
NBigCity η22 -35.705
∗ 12.880
Previous Ranking α 84.352∗ 23.622
LPopulation β1 15.985 12.199
MedInc β2 -1.461 0.910
EnPrice β3 -71.094
∗ 12.199
RGSP β4 -0.788 2.596
UnempRate β5 -94.492
∗ 20.707
CorpTaxEnv β6 -21.546 13.247
Std.Dev. σν 0.100
∗ 0.001
Note: ∗represents significant at 5% level.
(NBigCity.) It’s influence, however, is in the opposite direction than expected. Al-
though it’s not significant, the population in a state affects in a parallel way: the
higher the population, the better the business environment is. From these two find-
ings, a possible interpretation is what really matters to a state’s business environment
is not how many mid-size cities it has but whether it has a metropolitan area with
highly dense population or not.
Noticeably, each state’s climate with respect to the corporate tax (CorpTaxEnv)
appears to be insignificant. It is because a favorable tax environment may represent
both good and bad climate for business. On one hand, tax incentives attract more
business into a state. Firms can relocate their headquarters or manufacturing facilities
to a state that exempt or reduce the corporate tax. On the other hand, they may
be signs that a state struggles with unfavorable business environment and attempts
to boost business: when a state observes a harsh environment it may introduce a
tax incentive to attract more business and to change the climate. Due to these two
conflicting implications, CorpTaxEnv hardly influences the business environment of


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: Elasticities of Business Environment
Variable Parameter Elasticity













































Figure 3.1: Previous Ranking Elasticities of Business Environment
Note: Elasticities are evaluated at the mean value of predicted business environment.
Table 3.3 shows the predicted percent change in business environment from the
previous year for each state using the estimates obtained in Table 3.2. Overall, we
find falls of predicted business environment in most states, particulary due to the
financial hardship in US during the sample period. Of course, even though a state’s
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business environment is worsen, it is still able to achieve higher ranking in case the
environment of its competitors (i.e. states closely ranked) deteriorates more severely.
Table 3.4 is the elasticities of business environment with respect to each covariate.
A 10% increase in the previous ranking (e.g. from the 20th to the 22nd) results
in 3.2% decrease in business environment. Also, the percentage increase in energy
price (EnPrice) induces the highest percent decrease in business environment among
covariates, x’s. Although it is statistically significant, the influence of unemployment
rate (UnempRate) is marginal.
Figure 3.1 plots the previous ranking elasticities of business environment, evalu-
ated at the mean value of predicted business environment for different values of the
previous ranking. As shown in Figure 3.1 (a), states ranked higher in the previous
year show higher values of elasticity, meaning less elastic to the percent change in the
previous ranking. To understand the influence of a unit change in the previous rank-
ing (i.e. from the first to the second, from the second to the third, and so on,) Figure
3.1 (b) draws the semi-elasticities. From this figure, it is clear that the higher a state
was ranked in the previous year, the more the percent decrease occurs by a unit-drop
in the previous ranking. For example, a state that ranked first in the previous year
would have 3.4% decrease in business environment on average if it was ranked second.
However, a state ranked 25th and one ranked 49th would obtain 0.68% and 0.48%
lower business environment on average if it was ranked 26th and 50th, respectively.
Notice that it is convex according to how the g function is defined.
Finally, Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are the percent changes in business environment in
each state and each year from the previous year induced by changes in ranking.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have set up a dynamic panel model with latent output vari-


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































announced annually by Forbes magazine. We have seen that why a typical panel
model fails the estimation with precision when n is large and T is small. This study
overcomes this challenge by utilizing the mixed exploded logit which uses the infor-
mation from all pairwise ranking orders. The estimation results for five time periods






Head Size as a Quality Measure in 2005-2009
In this appendix, we discuss why almost all observable product characteristics are
taste characteristics: consumers perceive many product characteristics in a Hotelling
sense, as modeled in Section 1.3. Also we see why the size of a driver’s head can serve
as a quality measure in the time frame of dataset analyzed in this study: 2005-2009.
As introduced in Section 1.1 a specific feature of the golf driver is almost all ob-
servable product characteristics depend on consumers’ taste while having a quality
difference over products at least over time. This feature poses both a challenge and an
opportunity to the researcher. A challenge to an econometrician is requesting to find
an appropriate observable and discernable quality measure in a vertical sense. On the
other hand, an opportunity of examining consumers’ behavioral characteristics opens
up once the quality is controlled for. A carefully chosen quality measure success-
fully explains true quality of products and lets consumers’ behavioral characteristics
identified if there is any.
The characteristics of a driver that depend on consumers’ taste are decomposed
into two parts: (1) bona fide taste characteristics and (2) characteristics having trade-
offs between them. This decomposition is worth to compare to the distinction between
search and experience characteristics as described in Stigler (1961). Before they
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purchase consumers can observe and verify search characteristics, e.g. the shape
and loft of head. Contrastingly, experience characteristics are not typically known
to consumers before testing the product, e.g. feel of grip or ball flight. Consumers
however may have information on experience characteristics via magazine reviews,
announced test results, or golf buddies’ opinion. Characteristics in our first category
is a comparable mix of search and experience characteristics whereas the second
category mainly consists of experience characteristics.
First, the bona fide taste characteristics include all characteristics subject to each
consumer’s own taste purely. Hence no consensus can be obtained due to the nature
of them. Some consumers like the hitting sound of a driver, which is an important
factor that golfers care when they test a new driver, but some think its sound is
detestable. Letting alone the unobservable taste characteristics, many of observable
characteristics of a driver fall into this category including the shape and loft of head,
length and stiffness of shaft, and feel of grip among others. The bona fide taste
characteristics are completely free from consideration in a vertical sense.
The second category of characteristics needs more careful attention. Many char-
acteristics of a driver, observable at least indirectly through a good many available
test results, are conceptualized in a vertical sense individually, e.g. hitting distance,
forgiveness, accuracy, and controllability (or playability1) In other words, consumers
unanimously agree that a certain behavior of a driver is superior to the opposite
behavior on a specific characteristic ceteris paribus, e.g. consumers prefers longer
distance and higher accuracy holding others equal. Due to the technological trade-off
among the characteristics in this category, however, a combination of this type of fea-
tures is not well-ordered. A driver loses forgiveness in exchange of improved distance,
1The term “playability” is defined as the degree of how easy or difficult the clubs are to play for
golfers of different skill levels. For example, a cavity back iron with significant perimeter weighting
is clearly easier for most golfers to handle than a muscleback blade. We say the former shows higher
playability. To golfers with advanced skills who care accuracy or distance a lot, however, higher
playability of a golf club does not necessarily mean better quality since there is a trade-off between
accuracy or distance and in ease of control.
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one of the well-known trade-offs. Consumers’ choices regarding these two charac-
teristics are made in a horizontal sense depending on their taste or more precisely
own order of importance between the characteristics. Moreover, even on a specific
characteristic each consumer assesses differently: one feels driver A hits longer than
B but another may think in the opposite direction.
Both Table A.1 and Table A.2 show the professional test results of selected golf
drivers: notice both categories of taste characteristics are tested. To evaluate the
characteristics of drivers, 60 golfers of varying skill levels hit a group of 5 to 7 driver
models each year. They are told not to compare one driver to another but only to
rate how they performed with each driver. The ratings are highly concentrated within
a range far less than 1 in all criteria on a scale of 1 to 10 in each year as a result of
averaging over testers with varying skill levels therefore wide range of taste.
A question worth to investigate is then whether the quality is enhanced over time
or not in a vertical sense. As the ratings in Tables A.1 and A.2 are normalized over
time, the test results suggest overall quality has been improved from 2006 to 2009:
average of overall rating has risen from 7.9 to 8.43. Even though the difference is
not huge the newer model of each brand receives generally higher ratings throughout
all test categories (see Cleveland Launcher Ti460 (2006) versus Cleveland Launcher
(2009) and Mizuno MX500 460 (2006) versus Mizuno MX 700 (2009) for instance.)
It arouses the need of quality measure that captures evolution of products, as firms
advertise more often than not that their new model is longer, faster, and stronger
than its predecessors. Enhanced quality is achieved in two ways: (1) a Pareto im-
provement, e.g. showing longer hitting distance with better forgiveness or at least
without weakening forgiveness, and (2) not a Pareto improvement but the gain in a
characteristic dominates the loss in another, e.g. achieving much longer distance with
a slight loss in forgiveness.2
2Think of putting two balls in different size, red and white, into a box. You want the total volume












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It is not appropriate to take the ratings in Tables A.1 and A.2 as a measure of
quality since they are on the taste characteristics as described above and rating values
are tightly close to each other subsequently.3 In short of remained observable charac-
teristics, a candidate for a quality indicator must explain the technological difference
within the time frame of the study by representing the main stream innovation issue
successfully in a specific period with sufficient variability.
The time period of 2005-2009 was the era of maturing the head size. Figure A.1
shows the time paths of average head size in the market: simple and weighted (by
sales) averages from December 2004 to December 2009. Both simple and weighted
averages show a gradual increase in average head size. They hit the maximum volume
level of 460cc at the start of 2008 then stay close to it.
Figure A.1: Monthly Average Head Size of Drivers
Note: Head size is in cubic centimeters. The US Golf Association institutes a size rule
which states that no clubhead can measure greater than 460cc. The weighted average
is weighted by the volume of sales.
put a big red ball into the box by sacrificing the size of white ball, and vice versa. What really
matters is then the size of the box, not each ball’s relative size. Each person has different preference
on relative size of balls but can always obtain bigger sum of ball sizes as she would like when the
box got larger. Quality of a driver corresponds to the box size in this example.
3Another challenge in practice is not all models in the data are tested and rated due to various
reasons. Some major brands decline to participate in the test and many minor models are not
included lacking in mass interest.
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The heads of almost all drivers are made of titanium and the Coefficient of Resti-
tution (COR) of all drivers has reached its permitted limit.4 It is generally accepted
that a driver with a bigger head outperforms the significantly smaller-headed ones.
First and foremost, it definitely yields better forgiveness with a larger face. Even
though a golfer mis-hits a ball more or less, it may carry the ball in the desired direc-
tion. As a result of the rapidly-increasing size of driver heads in the late 1990s and
the advantage of a bigger head size, the US Golf Association (USGA) curbed the vol-
umetric growth of drivers by instituting a size rule which states that no clubhead can
measure greater than 460 cubic centimeters. Manufacturers maintain a light enough
weight of a big-headed driver with the use of lighter, stronger, and more expensive
material, titanium. Firm’s cost of developing/manufacturing a bigger head would be
higher than smaller ones. It calls for the use of expensive material and requires more
subtle technology to balance the center of gravity and so on. In sum, a bigger head
size typically represents a better performance and a higher manufacturing cost.
4The material of head has been meliorated from wood to stainless steel in late 1980’s and to
titanium in mid-1990’s. The COR has been grown. The COR is a measure of the energy loss or
retention when two objects collide. The higher the value of COR a driver has, the harder a ball is
bounced resulting a longer hitting distance. A time of competition to improve the COR has passed
since all drivers reached the limit permitted by the US Golf Association (USGA) as of early 2000s.
Once a technological improvement has been matured in an aspect then R&D efforts and accordingly
advertising is focused on new innovation.
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APPENDIX B
Derivation of the Observed Information Matrix
Louis (1982) shows that the observed information matrix I can be obtained as












≡ I1 (Θ)− I2 (Θ) .
We investigate these two terms separately. The multi-spell case in Section 5 can be
handled similarly using the generalized log-likelihood (2.22).
Complete data information matrix I1 (Θ) Under the regularity conditions, it
can be obtained as I1 (Θ) = −∂2Q (Θ) /∂Θ∂Θ′ from the E-step. More precisely, from















where ψi,t = exp(γt)φ(z
′
i,tθ). Since the maximization procedures of p and (γ, θ, q)
can be separated, the Hessian matrix of Qi (Θ) is block diagonal. In particular,
102


























































(for k = 1, · · · , m− 1)
with pm = 1−
∑m−1
j=1 pj, where Ψ
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i,t. The complete data information




′, where ∂2Qi (Θ) /∂Θ∂Θ
′
consists of the second derivatives obtained above conformably with the array of pa-
rameters
Θ = (γ1, · · · , γT , θ′, q1, · · · , qm, p1, · · · , pm−1)′ . (B.2)
All other terms are zero since ∂2Qi (Θ) /∂Θ∂Θ
′ is block diagonal.































































(for k = 1, · · · , m− 1),
where Aij is defined as (B.1). We let


















Then, since Covv (ηik, ηi) = πik (1− πik) 1{k = } for k,  = 1, · · · , m from the defi-
nition of ηij , where the covariance Covv(·) and the variance Vv(·) are taken over the
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for t = 1, · · · , T , k = 1, · · · , m and  = 1, · · · , m−1. The missing information matrix
is then given by I2 (Θ) =
∑n
i=1Vv (∂ logLi (Θ) /∂Θ), where Vv (∂ logLi (Θ) /∂Θ) con-
sists of covariance matrices obtained above conformably with the array of parameters
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